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PUBLIC COURTS VERSUS PRIVATE JUSTICE: IT'S TIME TO LET
SOME SUN SHINE IN ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
LAURIE KRATKY DoRIt*
"People who want secrecy should opt for arbitration. When they call
on the courts, they must accept the openness that goes with subsidized dis-
pute resolution by public (and publicly accountable) officials. Judicial pro-
ceedings are public rather than private property."'
INTRODUCTION
Since the early to mid-1990s, the issue of secrecy in litigation has at-
tracted nationwide attention and has generated a literal mountain of com-
mentary (including some of my articles).2 Judges, think-tanks, and bar
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well as the generous research stipends provided by the Drake University Law School Endowment Trust.
I especially wish to thank my husband and colleague, Matthew Dor6, for his invaluable input and
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1. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000).
2. See Laurie Kratky Dor6, Settlement, Secrecy, and Judicial Discretion: South Carolina's New
Rules Governing the Sealing of Settlements, 55 S.C. L. REV. 791 (2004) [hereinafter Dor6, Settlement];
Laurie Kratky Dor6, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Set-
tlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283 (1999) [hereinafter Dor6, Secrecy by Consent]; see also Joseph
F. Anderson Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case Against Government-
Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711 (2004); Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of
Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955 (1988); Richard P. Campbell, The Protective Order in
Products Liability Litigation: Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C. L. REV. 771 (1990); David A. Dana &
Susan P. Koniak, Secret Settlements and Practice Restrictions Aid Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other
Harms, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1217 (2003); Lloyd Doggett & Michael J. Mucchetti, Public Access to
Public Courts: Discouraging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEX. L. REV. 643 (1991); Emily Fiftal,
Respecting Litigants' Privacy and Public Needs: Striking Middle Ground in an Approach to Secret
Settlements, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503 (2003); John P. Freeman, The Ethics of Using Judges to
Conceal Wrongdoing, 55 S.C. L. REV. 829 (2004); Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation:
Discovery and Party Agreements, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 67 (2000); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases
Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994); Alan E.
Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 261 (1998);
Stephen Gillers & Richard W. Painter, Free the Lawyers: A Proposal to Permit No-Sue Promises in
Settlement Agreements, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291 (2005); Stephen Gillers, Speak No Evil: Settle-
ment Agreements Conditioned on Noncooperation Are Illegal and Unethical, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1
(2002); FRANCIS H. HARE, JR. ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: COMBATING STONEWALLING AND OTHER
DISCOVERY ABUSES (1994); Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned in
Discovery Legal, Illegal, or Something in Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783 (2002); Leandra Leder-
man, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-Party Involvement in Settle-
ments?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221 (1999); David Luban, Limiting Secret Settlements by Law, 2 J.
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associations have convened task forces devoted to confidentiality in the
courts, 3 and several academic symposia like this one have been dedicated
to the subject.4
As the name of this Symposium suggests, much of the commentary,
and virtually all of the reforms concerning this topic, center upon litigation
confidentiality-protective orders governing discovery, the sealing of judi-
cial records and files, confidentiality orders and secret settlements. The part
such confidentiality orders and agreements have played in lawsuits involv-
ing defective products, toxic torts, clergy sexual abuse, and financial fraud
INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1999) [hereinafter Luban, Limiting Secret Settlements]; David
Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995) [hereinafter Luban,
Settlements and Erosion]; Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL.
L. REV. 457 (1991); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995); Suzanna M. Meyers,
Doing Their Jobs: An Argument for Greater Media Access to Settlement Agreements, 14 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 603 (2004); Abner J. Mikva, The Role of Judges in Secret Judgments,
55 S.C. L. REV. 773 (2004); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to
the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991); Jack E. Pace III, Testing the Security Blanket: An Analysis
of Recent Challenges to Stipulated Blanket Protective Orders, ANTITRUST, Summer 2005, at 46; Judith
Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudica-
tion at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471 (1994) [hereinafter Resnik, Whose
Judgment?]; James E. Rooks Jr., Settlements and Secrets: Is the Sunshine Chilly?, 55 S.C. L. REV. 859
(2004); David S. Sanson, The Pervasive Problem of Court-Sanctioned Secrecy and the Exigency of
National Reform, 53 DUKE L.J. 807 (2003); Elizabeth E. Spainhour, Unsealing Settlements: Recent
Efforts to Expose Settlement Agreements That Conceal Public Hazards, 82 N.C. L. REV. 2155 (2004);
Jean Hoefer Toal & Bratton Riley, The New Role of Secret Settlements in the South Carolina Justice
System, 55 S.C. L. REV. 761 (2004); Heather Waldbeser & Heather DeGrave, A Plaintiffs Lawyer's
Dilemma: The Ethics of Entering a Confidential Settlement, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 815 (2003); Jack
B. Weinstein & Catherine Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 1 (2001)
[hereinafter Weinstein & Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science]; Jack B. Weinstein, Secrecy in Civil
Trials: Some Tentative Views, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 53 (2000) [hereinafter Weinstein, Secrecy in Civil Trials];
Richard Zitrin, The Judicial Function: Justice Between the Parties, or a Broader Public Interest?, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1565 (2004) [hereinafter Zitrin, Judicial Function]; Richard A. Zitrin, The Laudable
South Carolina Court Rules Must Be Broadened, 55 S.C. L. REV. 883 (2004) [hereinafter Zitrin, Laud-
able South Carolina Rules]; Richard Zitrin, Why Lawyers Keep Secrets About Public Harm, 12 PROF.
LAW. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Zitrin, Why Lawyers Keep Secrets]; Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against
Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 115
(1999) [hereinafter Zitrin, Case Against Secret Settlements]; Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Set-
tlement out of the Shadows: Information About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L.
REv. 663 (2001); Jillian Smith, Comment, Secret Settlements: What You Don't Know Can Kill You!,
2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 237 (2004).
3. See The Sedona Conference Working Group on Protective Orders, Confidentiality & Public
Access, The Sedona Guidelines: Best Practices Addressing Protective Orders, Confidentiality & Public
Access in Civil Cases, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 183 (2005) [hereinafter Sedona Guidelines], available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/abaannual/papers/06b.pdf (April 2005 Revised Public Comment Draft
Version); CONN. BAR ASS'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE COURTS
(2004) [hereinafter CBA REPORT]; Laurie Kratky Dor6, Address at the Federal Judicial Center, Work-
shop for U.S. Magistrate Judges (Feb. 21, 2003); Laurie Kratky Dor& , Address at the Roscoe Pound
Institute Regional Forum for State Court Judges (Jan. 31, 2003).
4. See Symposium, Court-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REv. 711 (2004); Symposium, Behind
Closed Doors: SecretJustice in America, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 1 (2000).
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continues to fuel the controversy over court secrecy.5 That debate questions
whether judges routinely rubber-stamp confidentiality requests in their zeal
to promote the strong public policy favoring settlement. 6 The recurring
scandals and the ensuing calls for "sunshine in litigation" have led a num-
ber of courts and legislatures to restrict the discretion of judges to issue
protective, confidentiality, and sealing orders in cases that could compro-
mise public health and safety.
7
At bottom, these sunshine efforts reflect the long-established com-
mitment to open courts and the traditionally strong presumption of public
access to judicial records and proceedings. 8 A judge represents a broader
public interest, even when adjudicating a seemingly private dispute, and
must carefully balance any legitimate need for secrecy against any counter-
vailing public interest in disclosure. In a publicly-created, staffed, and
heavily subsidized court system, secrecy should be the exception, rather
than the rule because the courts are more than merely "a public service for
private dispute resolution."9
Ironically, this increased transparency in civil litigation may have
wrought an unintended and unwelcome consequence-the diversion of
more civil disputes into alternative dispute resolution proceedings like arbi-
tration, where the public is "shut out of information almost completely"
5. In the Firestone litigation, for example, the recall of over fourteen million Wilderness AT
tires, and the subsequent Congressional investigation into Firestone and Ford's alleged culpability,
came eight years after the first of numerous product liability lawsuits concerning a tire that has now
been linked to approximately 271 deaths (and many more injuries) in the United States alone. Many of
those Firestone cases were confidentially settled, with discovery and court files concealed by agreed
protective and sealing orders. See Roselyn Bonanti et al., The Message of the Firestone/Ford Tragedy,
TRIAL, Apr. 2001, at 52. Similarly, in the beginning of 2002, the Boston Globe stunned the nation when
it revealed that in the previous decade, the Archdiocese of Boston had quietly settled child molestation
claims against at least seventy priests. See Stephanie S. Abrutyn, Commentary, Courts Just as Guilty in
Church Coverup, HARTFORD COURANT, May 26, 2002, at Cl. Prior to these more recent scandals,
similar lawsuits involving products like GM's side-mounted gas tanks, the Dalkon shield, the Shiley
heart valve, BIC lighters, toxic torts involving Xerox and the town of Wobum, and prescription drugs
like Zomax, Halcion, and the DTP vaccine, flew below public radar cloaked by confidentiality orders
and agreements. See Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 2, at 300-01.
6. See Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 2, at 301, 303-09 (describing the competing argu-
ments in the confidentiality debate).
7. See infra Part I (discussing litigation confidentiality and reform efforts in numerous jurisdic-
tions).
8. See infra Part L.A (exploring the right of public access to judicial records and proceedings in
civil litigation).
9. Dorf, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 2, at 287. See also Luban, Limiting Secret Settlements,
supra note 2, at 127 (contending that courts are more than a "system of private justice for dispute
resolution" and serve interests beyond "the private convenience of the litigants"); Weinstein & Wim-
berly, Secrecy in Law and Science, supra note 2, at 25 (challenging view of judges as merely neutral
arbiters resolving private disputes).
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and the public interest is "more readily ignored."' 10 Judges admonish liti-
gants who "want secrecy [to] opt for arbitration,"'1 and parties thus in-
creasingly turn to "private" dispute resolution precisely because of its
privacy. 12 Arbitration is frequently conducted pursuant to confidentiality
rules and agreements that can conceal the existence and substance of a
dispute, the identities of the parties, and the resolution of the controversy.
Mediation proceedings, frequently cloaked with an evidentiary privilege,
are accorded even more privacy. Public policy strongly encourages alterna-
tive dispute resolution, 13 and courts and legislatures unquestioningly as-
sume that confidentiality is essential to its efficient and effective
functioning. 14 In contrast to litigation, then, ADR largely operates in an
"environment of secrecy" whose "closed doors can mask a world of mis-
chief." 15
In this Article, I explore this current dichotomy between open court
proceedings and private ADR and examine whether the confidentiality
traditionally accorded ADR is always justified. Courts today find them-
selves entangled in a multitude of dispute resolution processes that take
10. Weinstein & Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science, supra note 2, at 20, 25 n.102. See also
Stephanie Brenowitz, Note, Deadly Secrecy: The Erosion of Public Information Under Private Justice,
19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 679, 693 (2004) (attributing increase in ADR as ironic consequence of
attempts to ban confidential settlements).
11. Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Baxter Int'l, Inc.
v. Abbott Labs., 297 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that closed arbitration presents "a sure path
to dispute resolution with complete confidentiality").
12. Brenowitz, supra note 10, at 693 (positing that "parties that are concerned about publicity may
be more inclined to proceed to arbitration and mediation, which limit the access of the press and public
even more [than litigation]"); Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory ofAlterna-
tive Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 1086 (2000) [hereinafter
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity] (acknowledging that "[p]rivacy can be an important consideration in
the decision to waive full-blown trial rights in favor of the arbitral forum"); Weinstein & Wimberly,
Secrecy in Law and Science, supra note 2, at 20 (citing confidentiality as one of reasons for arbitration's
popularity).
13. Congress explicitly recognized this strong federal policy favoring ADR when it enacted the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2000). See also infra Part
II.B.I for a discussion of the ADR Act and the push to promote ADR.
14. See Ellen E. Deason, Procedural Rules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and Media-
tion-Worldwide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553, 563-65 (2005) [hereinafter Deason, Complementary
Systems] (discussing the need for confidentiality in mediation); Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model
and Agenda for Civil Justice Reforms in the States, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1553, 1578 (1994) [hereinafter
Sherman, A Process Model] (characterizing need for confidentiality as a "canon of faith" for media-
tors); David B. Young, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Bankruptcy, in 25TH ANNUAL CURRENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY AND ORGANIZATION 2004, at 863, 900 (PLI Commercial Law and
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. A-861, 2004) (stating that "[flew would question.., that most
ADR proceedings.., must be kept confidential").
15. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12, at 964. See also Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor
Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (criticizing private arbitration proceedings because
they "prevent the public from discovering ... acts and practices" violative of consumer protection
statutes); Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1, 8 (Mont. 2002) (asking whether arbitration
proceedings "shrouded in secrecy ... conceal illegal, oppressive or wrongful business practices").
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them far afield of traditional adjudication. 16 Judicial involvement in these
alternative processes blurs the line between public and private dispute reso-
lution and arguably triggers the presumption of public access to judicial
proceedings. Moreover, an increasing number of disputes that would oth-
erwise be litigated before a judge in an open court are being diverted into
arbitration through binding predispute adhesion contracts. Employees
harmed by discrimination and sexual harassment, investors defrauded by
securities and financial schemes, consumers bilked by deceptive or unfair
trade practices, even victims of serious personal injury, are more likely than
ever to find themselves before an arbitrator in a closed arbitral forum. 17
These disputes, which radiate beyond the immediate parties, implicate a
broader public interest that, if litigated, might very well cause a judge to
deny a protective order or unseal court files. Does the mere fact that these
cases are now siphoned from the court system and routed to private arbitra-
tors mandate a different result? Should a generalized need for confidential-
ity to promote alternative dispute resolution override the interest that
regulatory agencies, other claimants, potential victims, the media, and the
general public may possess in information generated in those proceedings?
Can the remedial and deterrent functions of the statutory claims at issue be
effectuated in a secret tribunal? This Article examines these and other is-
sues raised by ADR confidentiality.
Part I reviews the current approach to litigation confidentiality, which
generally requires "good cause" for any type of court-enforced secrecy.
Sunshine reforms in a number of jurisdictions have increased (at least theo-
retically) public access to virtually all phases of civil lawsuits, including
discovery, court dockets and files, even confidential settlements. In the
world of litigation, a public interest in disclosure may well override the
litigants' mutual desire for secrecy and the public policy favoring settle-
ment. 18
16. See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597 (2005) [herein-
after Resnik, Procedure as Contract] (noting that arbitration and mediation "have been brought inside
the courts, thereby changing that which is 'judicial"'); Jean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal:
Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR in Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 681, 690 (2005)
[hereinafter Stemlight, Separate and Not Equal] (commenting upon the "real-world blending" of litiga-
tion and other dispute resolution approaches).
17. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395 (1999) (discussing arbitration of employment discrimination claims); Jean R.
Stemlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient
Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2004) (exploring
mandatory arbitration of consumer claims); Elizabeth G. Thomburg, Contracting with Tortfeasors:
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and Personal Injury Claims, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (2004)
(examining arbitration of personal injury claims arising out of contractual relationships).
18. See infra Part I (discussing litigation confidentiality).
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A similar tilt toward transparency has not occurred in ADR. Part II
addresses the secret environment of ADR, describing the scope and source
of confidentiality accorded both arbitration and mediation. In arbitration,
principles of self-determination and party choice enable participants to
keep their dispute and its resolution confidential. 19 The public policy favor-
ing settlement assumes primacy, and the public is told that it has no interest
in the resolution of these private disputes. Unlike litigation, no neutral and
publicly accountable gatekeeper considers, let alone protects, the public
interest in disclosure. And other attributes of arbitration, such as waiver of
class actions, limited judicial review, closed and unrecorded hearings, and
the lack of written, reasoned decisions, further hide the dispute from public
view.20 In mediation, evidentiary privileges can conceal information rele-
vant to other disputes and of general public interest. 21
Part III describes and evaluates the recent efforts of some courts to
regulate ADR secrecy in disputes that implicate broader public policy in-
terests. A number of courts have utilized contract doctrines such as uncon-
scionability and public policy to render confidentiality clauses in arbitration
agreements unenforceable. 22 Other courts unseal or refuse to seal arbitra-
tion decisions and awards filed for confirmation, modification, or vacatur.23
Still others balance the need for ADR privacy against the disclosure inter-
ests of other litigants and the general public.
24
These efforts suggest that the current dichotomy between litigation
and ADR confidentiality may not be completely justified. Part IV thus ad-
vances a more unified approach to confidentiality in dispute resolution that
calls for greater scrutiny of ADR secrecy. The Article concludes by sug-
gesting the need for both judicial and legislative regulation aimed at in-
creasing the transparency of ADR, particularly for claims that are grounded
in public policy or are otherwise of legitimate public interest.
19. In mediation, even party choice may not trump the privileged nature of mediation communica-
tions. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing mediation privilege).
20. See infra Part IL.A (contrasting the openness of litigation with the closed doors of ADR).
21. See infra Part Il.B (examining confidentiality in mediation and court-connected ADR).
22. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding confidentiality
clause unconscionable); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1180-81 (Ohio Ct. App.
2004) (holding secrecy provision of consumer arbitration clause violative of Ohio public policy). For a
discussion of these contract defenses to arbitration clauses, see infra Part III.A.1.
23. See, e.g., Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., 345 F. Supp. 2d 497 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (unseal-
ing arbitration award).
24. See infra Part III.A.3 (examining discovery of confidential arbitrations), and Part TlI.B (dis-
cussing how mediation privilege can impede the discovery of otherwise relevant information).
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I. PUBLIC COURTS AND THE TILT TOWARD TRANSPARENCY
A. The Right to Open Courts
Open courts serve several important purposes. Access to civil cases
facilitates public monitoring and oversight of the taxpayer-subsidized judi-
cial system, which is "an essential feature of democratic control."25 Trans-
parency checks judicial incompetence or misconduct 26 and helps ensure
fair and accurate fact finding and decision making. 27 Public access educates
the public about the judicial system in general and its workings in a particu-
lar case.28 Ultimately, access enhances public confidence in and respect for
the civil justice system, thus encouraging its continued use and support.29
These rationales all buttress a qualified right of public access to civil
judicial proceedings and records. 30 Although courts differ as to its source,
scope, and strength,31 this presumption prohibits a court from sealing judi-
cial records unless a sufficient countervailing need for confidentiality ex-
25. United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995).
26. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1986) (holding that access to
criminal cases checks overzealous or corrupt prosecutors and biased or incompetent judges); Leucadia,
Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that access to civil
cases "diminishes the possibilities for injustice, incompetence, perjury, and fraud").
27. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982) (indicating that access
"safeguards the integrity of the fact-finding process"); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C.,
710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Openness in the courtroom discourages perjury and may result in
witnesses coming forward with new information regardless of the type of proceeding.").
28. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980) (declaring that access
provides "opportunity both for understanding the system in general and its workings in a particular
case"); Leucadia, Inc., 998 F.2d at 161 (indicating that access provides the "public with a more com-
plete understanding of the judicial system").
29. See Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 13 (suggesting that mere opportunity to observe judicial
proceedings fosters appearance of fairness essential to public confidence in courts). In addition to these
systemic objectives, public access may also serve remedial and deterrent substantive goals not provided
by closed ADR proceedings. See infra Part II.A.3.f-g.
30. See generally Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 2, at 317-24 (examining the right of
public access to civil judicial proceedings and records).
31. The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to extend either a First Amendment or a common law right of
access beyond the criminal arena. See id. at 319-20. The Circuits, however, have all generally recog-
nized at least a common law right to attend civil judicial proceedings and to inspect judicial records.
Many apply a more stringent First Amendment standard to at least civil trials and some judicial records.
Under such a constitutional standard, a court must find that an overriding or compelling interest justifies
confidentiality and then "narrowly tailor" any confidentiality order to serve that interest. See In re
Boston Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 181-82 (1st Cir. 2003); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,
846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988). Even the broader common law right, however, triggers a rebuttable
presumption in favor of public access. See Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 2, at 320 (indicating
that choice of First Amendment over common law "apparently influences only the strength of any
presumption of public access and the showing of confidentiality necessary to rebut that presumption").
Courts also differ as to which "judicial records" will trigger the presumption, see id. at 374-78 (discuss-
ing differing definitions of judicial records), and as to the appropriate weight to accord the presumption
if applicable, see id. at 378-80 (discussing weight of presumption).
2006]
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ists.32 Even without this presumption, only "good cause" can justify a pro-
tective or confidentiality order concerning nonjudicial records and informa-
tion produced in the course of civil litigation. 33 As discussed below, this
commitment to open courts and sensitivity to the right of public access
pervades all aspects of a civil lawsuit.
B. Sealed Dockets and Pseudonyms
1. Dockets
A recent secrecy scandal involving the state courts in Connecticut il-
lustrates the exceptionally strong right of public access to information con-
cerning the very existence of a lawsuit and the official index of its
proceedings. In late 2002, two Connecticut newspapers revealed that in the
previous thirty-eight years, state courts had sealed entire files of what ap-
peared to be thousands of civil cases.34 In some of these cases, court per-
sonnel were permitted to reveal only the existence and the caption of the
case. In others, files designated as "super-secret" were completely unavail-
able, and court personnel were prohibited from even acknowledging the
existence of the cases. The newspapers suggested that these and possibly
many other cases had been sealed "at the behest of prominent individuals
who were parties. ' '35 The reports astonished many, including members of
the Connecticut judiciary, and led to the eventual promulgation of more
stringent state court rules regulating the sealing of judicial records.36
On appeal of the newspapers' suit to access the super-secret cases, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized a First Amendment right of
public access to "docket sheets, which provide an index to the records of
judicial proceedings. '37 A tradition of accessibility surrounds this informa-
tion because court clerks are generally required to maintain public records
32. See infra Part 1.D for a discussion of the sealing of judicial records.
33. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c); see also Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786 (3d Cir.
1994) (requiring that courts find good cause to support all confidentiality orders).
34. See Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 86-89 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing back-
ground of the controversy); CBA REPORT, supra note 3, at 12-15 (outlining history of the issue in
Connecticut).
35. Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 86.
36. See CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 11-20(c)-(e), I1-20A (mandating that court notify public of
motions to seal or close courtroom and articulate the specific overriding interests that justify sealing
order).
37. Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 91. The newspapers sought to unseal the dockets sheets of
the cases whose very existence had been super-sealed.
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of court proceedings. 38 Further, access to docket sheets facilitates judicial
review of the trial court's underlying sealing decision. 39 And, public dis-
closure ensures that the First Amendment right to attend judicial proceed-
ings or inspect judicial records is more than "merely theoretical. '40 As
recognized by the Second Circuit, disclosure of docket sheets furthers
many of the rationales for open courts:
Precisely because docket sheets provide a map of the proceedings in the
underlying cases, their availability greatly enhances the appearance of
fairness. They have also been used to reveal potential judicial biases or
conflicts of interest. In addition, docket sheets furnish an "opportunity
both for understanding the system in general and its workings in a par-
ticular case." By inspecting materials like docket sheets, the public can
discern the prevalence of certain types of cases, the nature of the parties
to particular kinds of actions, information about the settlement rates in
different areas of law, and the types of materials that are likely to be
sealed. Thus docket sheets do not constitute the kinds of government re-
cords that function properly only if kept secret, like grand jury proceed-
ings. 41
Accordingly, the existence of a dispute and its docket index are "pub-
lic" components of a civil lawsuit to which a presumption of access at-
taches.
2. Pseudonyms
The actual identity of the parties to a civil lawsuit also falls within the
public's right of access to judicial records and proceedings. 42 In requiring
that a complaint "include the names of all the parties, ' 43 and that every
action "be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest," 44 the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure "provide no exception that allows parties to
proceed anonymously or under fictitious names such as initials. ' 45 Never-
38. Id. at 94. In finding a qualified First Amendment right of access, the Second Circuit relied
upon U.S. Supreme Court precedent evaluating claims of access to criminal proceedings. Under that
precedent, the First Amendment right turns upon two complementary considerations: tradition of acces-
sibility and functional utility. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 8-9
(1986).
39. Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 94.
40. Id. at 93. See also United States v. Ochoa-Vasquez, 428 F.3d 1015, 1029 (11th Cir. 2005)
(reminding courts that "public docket sheets are essential to provide 'meaningful access' to criminal
proceedings").
41. Hartford Courant Co., 380 F.3d at 95-96 (citations omitted). The Second Circuit ultimately
remanded the case for a determination of whether the defendant court administrators were authorized to
provide the required access. Id. at 86.
42. Doe v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464,467 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a).
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
45. W.N.J. v. Yocom, 257 F.3d 1171, 1172 (10th Cir. 2001).
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theless, federal courts have implicitly authorized pseudonymous litigation
in limited circumstances. 46
Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently criticized the overuse of pseudonyms in litigation, stating that
"[j]udicial proceedings are supposed to be open ... in order to enable the
proceedings to be monitored by the public. The concealment of a party's
name impedes public access to the facts of the case, which include the par-
ties' identity." 47 Additionally, the "public has a right to know who is utiliz-
ing the federal courts that its tax dollars support. '48 While no national
standard governs the practice, the parties' identities are presumptively pub-
lic information, and pseudonymous litigation is strongly disfavored.49 Ac-
cordingly, a judge should not automatically grant the "privilege of suing or
defending under a fictitious name... even if the opposing party does not
object. ' '50 Instead, a judge must independently determine whether excep-
tional circumstances or compelling privacy or security interests justify
pseudonymity. 51 Generally, courts reserve such special circumstances to
cases involving "children, rape victims and other particularly vulnerable
parties, '52 or matters of "utmost intimacy. '53 Significantly, courts should
not permit parties to conceal their identities simply to avoid economic in-
jury or "to protect [their] professional or economic life."'54
C. Discovery
Public access to documents and information generated in the discov-
ery phase of a civil lawsuit still presents one of the most difficult and hotly
46. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
47. Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004).
48. Coe v. County of Cook, 162 F.3d 491, 498 (7th Cit. 1998). See also Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield United of Wis., 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Identifying the parties... is an important
dimension of publicness. The people have a right to know who is using their courts."); Guerrilla Girls,
Inc. v. Kaz, 224 F.R.D. 571, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (criticizing pseudonyms as contrary to the "public's
legitimate interest in knowing the facts at issue in court proceedings").
49. Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d at 669.
50. Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 112 F.3d at 872.
51. See Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d at 669-70 (chastising trial court for failing to independ-
ently determine whether to permit plaintiff to conceal her name); Doe v. Evans, 202 F.R.D. 173, 175
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (indicating that the public's interest in knowing parties' identities should prevail unless
the "party requesting pseudonymity demonstrates that her interests in privacy or security justify pseu-
donymity"); Guerrilla Girls, Inc., 224 F.R.D. at 573 (recognizing court's discretion to permit parties to
proceed anonymously in "exceptional cases" or "special circumstances").
52. Roe v. City of Milwaukee, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1129 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (permitting HIV-
positive plaintiff to proceed under pseudonym).
53. Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (refusing to allow sexual assault victim
to proceed under fictitious name).
54. Guerrilla Girls, Inc., 224 F.R.D. at 573.
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contested issues facing the courts today.55 The public possesses no First
Amendment right of access to the discovery process, which is not a "public
component[] of a civil trial."'56 Access to raw discovery does not assist the
public in monitoring or understanding the judicial process or a court's prin-
cipal adjudicative function because raw discovery is never filed with, re-
viewed by, or relied upon by a court in its decision making. As such, many
jurisdictions regard discovery as a private activity that carries no presump-
tive right of public access.
57
A growing number of courts, however, regard "the fruits of pretrial
discovery... in the absence of a court order to the contrary, presumptively
public" unless the party opposing disclosure demonstrates good cause. 58
Under this view, the party seeking protection must articulate the specific
prejudice or harm from disclosure. Even if the court finds a particularized
need for confidentiality, it must balance the competing public and private
interests before issuing a protective order.59 The mutual agreement of the
litigants cannot dispense with the court's duty to make an independent and
meaningful determination of good cause. Thus, while a stipulated protec-
tive order may suspend the need for the producing party to demonstrate
good cause, 60 that party bears the ultimate burden of justifying continued
confidentiality should it be subject to later challenge.
61
55. The earliest debates concerning court secrecy focused primarily upon discovery confidentiality
and agreed protective orders. See Marcus, supra note 2; Miller, supra note 2. See also Dor6, Secrecy by
Consent, supra note 2, at 324 n.168 (identifying other early commentary concerning discovery confi-
dentiality).
56. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984).
57. See Estate of Frankl v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 853 A.2d 880, 886 (N.J. 2004) ("The
universal understanding in the legal community is that unfiled documents in discovery are not subject to
public access."). Although the public may possess no presumptive right of access, the litigants may
voluntarily disclose discovery documents to whomever they please unless barred from doing so by a
protective order. Id. at 886 n.5 (citations omitted).
58. Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Generally, the public can
gain access to litigation documents and information produced during discovery unless the party oppos-
ing disclosure shows 'good cause' why a protective order is necessary.").
59. Id. at 1211. Even jurisdictions that find no presumption of access to unfiled discovery are re-
visiting that view. See Estate of Frankl, 853 A.2d at 887 (referring to bar committee question of
whether New Jersey Supreme Court should "maintain the position that unfiled discovery is insulated
from forced public access").
60. Much of the debate surrounding discovery confidentiality concerns stipulated protective orders
issued at the inception of litigation. The parties agree to these orders in order to minimize discovery
disputes and eliminate the need to litigate confidentiality on a document-by-document basis. Such
orders permit the litigants to self-designate documents as "confidential" prior to producing them in
discovery. Unless challenged by the requesting party, this designation controls the subsequent use and
disclosure of the confidential information. An agreed protective order will typically prevent public
disclosure of the confidential information, restrict its use to the preparation, trial, or settlement of the
case at hand, and require its return or destruction upon resolution of the controversy. If the parties must
subsequently file any designated information with the court, they must do so under seal. Further, the
agreed restrictions on disclosure continue after resolution of the dispute and frequently become part of
any confidential settlement between the parties. By facilitating the cooperative exchange of discovery,
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Agreed protective orders frequently provide for the sealing of any
confidential discovery that is subsequently filed in connection with a mo-
tion or other application to the court.62 Most courts distinguish between
unfiled and filed discovery in evaluating the public's right of access. 63 As
discussed in the following section, when discovery subject to a protective
order is filed under seal, that information may qualify as a judicial record
subject to a strong presumption of public access.
D. Sealed Records and Files
As illustrated by the recent secrecy scandal in Connecticut, most sun-
shine in litigation reforms center upon the sealing of judicial records.64
Under these statutes and rules, neither the mere agreement of the parties
nor a generalized interest in settlement will justify the sealing of court
documents and files.65 Instead, judicial records and proceedings trigger a
these umbrella protective orders can be an extremely valuable tool in complex cases involving signifi-
cant quantities of documents. The confidentiality debate questions whether this interest in facilitating
the expeditious discovery and ultimate settlement of a case constitutes good cause, in itself, to issue a
protective order. See generally Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 2, at 332-44 (examining contro-
versy surrounding stipulated discovery protective orders).
61. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring
the producing party "to make an actual showing of good cause for.., continuing protection" of unfiled
documents produced under a stipulated protective order).
62. See Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 2, at 335 & n.213 (describing standard features of a
stipulated protective order).
63. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1134-35; Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1212.
64. See, e.g., CAL. APP. R. 12.5; CAL. TRIAL & PRETRIAL R. 243.1-243.4 (prescribing procedures
for sealing of court records in trial and appellate courts); CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 11-20A (prohibiting
sealing of materials on file or lodged with the court in connection with a court proceeding absent notice
to interested parties and affirmative trial court findings); DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIv. P. 5(g); DEL. R.
CHANCERY CT. 5(g); DEL. SUP. CT. R. 9(bb) (requiring judicial determination that good cause exists for
continued sealing of court records); GA. UNIFORM R. SUPER. CT. 21 (establishing procedural and sub-
stantive requirements for sealing of judicial records); IDAHO CT. ADMIN. R. 32(f) (requiring that court
make factual finding "as to whether the interest in privacy or public disclosure predominates" before
sealing judicial records in least restrictive fashion); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-5.5 (West 2002) (requir-
ing specific balancing of interests, findings of fact, and conclusions of law before sealing "judicial
public record"); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426 (C)-(E) (2005) (prohibiting sealing of records if
information relates to a public hazard); MASS. UNIF. R. IMPOUNDMENT P. 1, 7 (directing that the court
consider enumerated "relevant factors" in deciding to impound papers, documents, and exhibits); MICH.
CT. R. 8.119(F)(4) (limiting the court's discretion to seal "documents and records of any nature that are
filed with the clerk"); UNIF. R. N.Y. STATE TRIAL CTS. § 216.01 (requiring written finding of good
cause and consideration of public interest before sealing court records); S.C. R. Ctv. P. 41.1 (establish-
ing balancing factors to guide courts in deciding whether to seal documents); TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a (creat-
ing presumption of public access to "court records"). For an example of recent local federal rules
imposing similar restrictions on the sealing of judicial records, see, e.g., D.N.J. LOCAL Civ. R. 5.3
(adopted 2005; governing motions to seal or otherwise restrict public access); D.S.C. LOCAL Civ. R.
5.03(A) (adopted 2001; providing mandatory procedures for filing of documents under seal).
65. See, e.g., CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 11-20A(c) (stating that "agreement of the parties to seal...
shall not constitute a sufficient basis for the issuance of such an order"); MASS. UNIF. R. IMPOUNDMENT
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presumption of public access that can be rebutted only by a legitimate pri-
vacy or proprietary interest and a demonstrated need for confidentiality. 66
Accordingly, a number of jurisdictions currently prohibit the sealing of
documents filed with the court unless procedural and substantive require-
ments are first satisfied. 67
Although they differ in their specifics, most of these provisions man-
date some form of public notice of any motion to seal and provide an op-
portunity for interested persons to intervene or otherwise be heard. Motions
to seal generally must itemize the particular document(s) for which sealing
is sought, identify a legitimate interest in confidentiality and the clearly
defined and serious injury that would occur from disclosure, and explain
why less restrictive alternatives than sealing do not exist.68 A sealing order
can be no broader than necessary to protect the identified interest and must
be supported by specific findings of fact.69 In some cases, rules direct
courts to consider explicit public interests, such as public health and safety,
the administration of public office, the operation of government, or the
public significance of the lawsuit. 7
0
The public cannot monitor or understand its judges or the judicial sys-
tem without access to documents, testimony, exhibits, or other information
relevant to the judicial function. The presumption of access is thus at its
strongest with respect to documents central to the court's adjudication of a
dispute.71 Thus, even discovery subject to a stipulated protective order will
P. 7 (noting that party agreements are insufficient in themselves to constitute good cause necessary to
impound papers, documents, or exhibits).
66. See Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 2, at 378-82 (discussing the presumption of public
access to judicial records). Most jurisdictions do not vary the strength of the presumption with the type
of judicial record at issue or its role in the court's adjudication of the case. The Second Circuit has
refined the analysis to calibrate the strength of the presumption to the role the records or testimony play
in the courts' determination of the litigants' substantive rights. Under that view, the need for public
monitoring is at its strongest when the court performs its core dispute-resolving function. If a particular
record would only minimally aid in public oversight of the judicial function, the presumption is weak or
merely predictive. See United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (2d Cir. 1995). 1 have previ-
ously suggested that this approach may assist courts in determining confidentiality of other information
produced during the course of a civil lawsuit. See generally Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 2.
67. See supra note 64.
68. See, e.g., D.N.J. LOCAL Civ. R. 5.3(c)(2) (describing requirements of motions to seal); D.S.C.
LocAL Civ. R. 5.03(A) (stating mandatory procedures for filing of documents under seal).
69. See CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 11-20A(d).
70. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2004) (prohibiting concealment of public hazards);
LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. art. 1426 (C)-(E) (2005) (prohibiting sealing of records relevant to public
hazard); S.C. R. CIv. P. 41.1 (directing court to balance many factors including "the public or profes-
sional significance of the lawsuit" and "the public interest, including ... public health and safety");
TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a (creating presumption of public access to "court records" that "have a probable
adverse effect upon the general public health or safety, or the administration of public office, or the
operation of government").
71. See supra note 66.
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trigger an exceptionally strong presumption of access when attached to a
dispositive motion that "adjudicates substantive rights and serves as a sub-
stitute for trial."
'72
Moreover, because a court must opt for the least restrictive alternative
to sealing7 3 and the litigants must demonstrate a particularized need for
confidentiality, courts are especially hesitant to seal the entire record in a
case. Without particularized review of the contents of a court file, a judge
cannot assess the role any particular record plays in its decision making or
the corresponding need for public access. Accordingly, the entire file in a
case can be sealed only in exceptional or "extreme cases" that implicate a
"compelling interest in secrecy."' 74 Absent such a compelling interest, nei-
ther party agreement, nor an interest in promoting settlement, should war-
rant "hid[ing] a whole case from view."'7 5
E. Judicial Opinions, Decisions, Orders, and Judgments
Public monitoring and understanding of the judicial process require
disclosure of documents relevant and useful to a court's determination of
the litigants' substantive rights. A court's orders, judgments, and opinions
that resolve the factual and legal merits of a civil dispute are the "quintes-
sential" product of this adjudicative function.7 6 As recently reiterated by
the Third Circuit, "[j]udicial opinions are the core work-product of judges.
They are much more than findings of fact and conclusions of law; they
constitute the logical and analytical explanations of why a judge arrived at
72. Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). See also id. at
1136 (holding that stipulated protective order did not rebut presumption when protected discovery was
filed under seal as attachment to dispositive motion). In contrast, if discovery subject to a protective
order is filed in connection with a non-dispositive motion such as a motion to compel or for sanctions,
the trial court's prior determination of good cause may rebut any presumption of access and shift the
burden to the party seeking disclosure. Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir.
2002). That is, both unfiled discovery and discovery filed for non-adjudicative purposes are governed
by same "good cause" standard of Rule 26(c).
73. Options narrower than wholesale closure, such as redaction of private, proprietary, or privi-
leged information, frequently exist. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1137 (holding sealing order overbroad be-
cause private information could easily be redacted).
74. Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002). See also Dor , Secrecy by Consent, supra
note 2, at 391-92 (discussing the sealing of the entire record in a civil case); Dor6, Settlement, supra
note 2, at 819-20 (discussing requests to seal record pursuant to confidential settlement).
75. Union Oil Co. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that "the parties' confi-
dentiality agreement can not require a court to hide a whole case from view"). See also Hagestad v.
Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434-35 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that trial court failed to articulate supporting
reasons to seal entire record pursuant to parties' compromise); Brown v. Advantage Eng'g, Inc., 960
F.2d 1013, 1016 (11 th Cir. 1992) (finding it "immaterial" that sealing of entire record was "an integral
part" of court-facilitated settlement).
76. EEOC v. Nat'l Children's Ctr., Inc., 98 F.3d 1406, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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a specific decision. ' 77 In addition to explicating the court's decisions, ac-
cess to court orders, opinions, and judgments contributes to the develop-
ment of the common law and the principle of stare decisis. Judicial
precedents are "valuable to the legal community as a whole," and are thus
"not merely the property of private litigants. ' 78
Such core judicial work product deserves an exceptionally strong pre-
sumption of public access. Absent exceptional circumstances, a court
should refuse to seal its opinions or orders79 and deny requests to vacate its
judgments, even if the parties have conditioned settlement on confidential-
ity.80
F. Civil Trial
A trial is a presumptively public phase of a civil lawsuit to which even
a First Amendment right of access likely attaches. 81 In addition to the right
to attend and observe trial proceedings, the public has a qualified right to
inspect evidence introduced at a civil trial.82 Unlike unfiled discovery, such
evidence has been screened for admissibility and relevance and is central to
the court's adjudication of the merits. Thus, notwithstanding party consent,
"only the most compelling showing" of a need for confidentiality can jus-
tify sealing testimony or exhibits introduced at trial. 83
77. Bright v. Westmoreland County, 380 F.3d 729, 732 (3d Cir. 2004).
78. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994). The public value
of judicial decisions helps explain the continuing controversy relating to unpublished opinions. See
generally Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if they Publish? Or Does the
Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM.
U. L. REv. 757 (1995).
79. See Nat'l Children's Ctr., 98 F.3d at 1410 (holding that trial court erroneously sealed its own
consent decree).
80. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co., 513 U.S. at 29 (holding that only "exceptional circumstances"
can justify vacatur of civil judgments and that "exceptional circumstances do not include the mere fact
that the settlement agreement provides for vacatur"). For a discussion of settlement and vacatur, see
generally Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through
Settlement and Vacatur, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 589 (1991); Resnik, Whose Judgment?, supra note 2.
81. See Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that First
Amendment right of public access extends to civil trials); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (indicating that the press and public possess the First Amendment right
to attend civil proceedings).
82. In re NBC, 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980).
83. Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 533 (1st Cir. 1993). See generally, Dor6, Secrecy
by Consent, supra note 2, at 371-72. Of course, once trial exhibits have been returned to the parties
following the trial and appeal of a case, they are no longer judicial records subject to compelled disclo-




Trial as a method of civil dispute resolution is quickly "vanishing" and
civil lawsuits are increasingly resolved through pretrial adjudication or
private settlement. 84 Although empirical studies and academic symposia
continue to ponder the reasons for this decline in trial rates, many partially
attribute it to the judicial promotion of settlement and the increasing diver-
sion of disputes into alternative dispute resolution.85 Settlement straddles
the divide between civil litigation and ADR. The approach toward settle-
ment confidentiality thus helps to illuminate the current dichotomy between
secrecy in litigation and secrecy in ADR.
Unless judicial approval of settlement is required by statute or court
rule,86 the parties to a civil lawsuit possess wide latitude to confidentially
settle their dispute through stipulated dismissal. In such cases, confidential-
ity is treated solely as a matter of private contract. Litigants can promise
not to disclose the existence, terms, or amount of their compromise or to
refrain from discussing the facts underlying their dispute.87 Because the
settlement is never filed, the court lacks discretion to police its terms or
mandate its public disclosure. 88
Frequently, however, litigants additionally request judicial assistance
to ensure settlement confidentiality. 89 Settling parties may file their com-
promise with the court, seeking court approval, the retention of post-
dismissal enforcement jurisdiction, or the entry of a consent decree. Set-
tlement may also be conditioned upon the court's sealing of judicial records
and files or the continued maintenance of a stipulated protective order that
governed discovery produced in the settled suit. Or, litigants may ask that
84. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004) (reporting that percentage of
federal civil cases resolved by trial fell from 11.5% in 1962 to 1.8% in 2002); Patricia Lee Refo, The
Vanishing Trial, LITIGATION, Winter 2004, at 1, 2 (reporting that rate of case termination by summary
judgment rose from 2.8% in 1960 to 7.7% in 2000).
85. See Refo, supra note 84, at 58 (suggesting that alternative dispute resolution contributes to the
declining trial rates).
86. In order to bind absent class members, a court must approve the settlement of any certified
class action as "fair, reasonable, and adequate." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(l)(A), (C). See also FED. R. CIV.
P. 23.1 (requiring court approval of settlement of shareholder derivative suits).
87. See generally Dor6, Settlement, supra note 2, at 798-800 (examining confidentiality through
private contract).
88. See Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2004) (acknowledging that
filing of stipulation of dismissal generally divests court of all jurisdiction over a case).
89. See generally Dor6, Settlement, supra note 2, at 798-804 (discussing reasons why litigants
may wish to involve the court in their settlements).
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the court issue a confidentiality order that enhances compliance with non-
disclosure agreements and deters third-party discovery requests.90
Whether directed by statute or court rule, or motivated by the broader
public interest, courts appear increasingly reluctant to blindly endorse these
stipulated requests for settlement confidentiality. As passionately voiced by
Chief Judge Joseph Anderson of the South Carolina federal district court,
Court-ordered secrecy is an issue that we in the third branch of gov-
ernment cannot overlook. True, court-ordered secrecy occurs in a small
(though underreported) number of cases. But is it usually the very cases
that are undeserving, primarily cases involving conduct with the poten-
tial for future harm, in which government-enforced secrecy is sought.
... [J]udicial officers at all levels must be ever-conscious of the
sometimes harmful consequences-to future litigants and to our system
of justice-of acquiescing in court-ordered secrecy for the sake of a set-
tlement. A judge's signature represents a public act of a public official.
Litigants should not be allowed to appropriate that signature by merely
handing up a consent order, especially one that restricts access to infor-
mation about the operation of the third branch of government.91
Court rules in many jurisdictions thus prohibit or restrict the sealing of
settlement agreements. 92 Confidentiality clauses do not bind the court, and
settling parties "cannot expunge the public interest [in judicial records and
files] by the simple expedient of filing a stipulation of dismissal with the
court. ' 9 3 Instead, courts retain continuing supervisory power over their own
records "[s]o long as they remain under the aegis of the court," and, as the
"primary representative of the public interest, ... [the court] is duty-
90. A confidentiality order enforceable by contempt arguably deters unauthorized disclosures
better than a private suit for breach of a confidentiality agreement. Likewise, while a private confidenti-
ality agreement will not bind third parties, a confidentiality order may be recognized by other courts and
prevent other litigants from discovering the protected information. See Dor6, Settlement, supra note 2,
at 802-03.
91. Anderson, supra note 2, at 750. Chief Judge Anderson was the architect of the first-in-the-
nation local federal rule that prohibited the sealing of settlements filed with the court. See D.S.C.
LOCAL CIv. R. 5.03.
92. See, e.g., D.S.C. LOCAL C1v. R. 5.03 (prohibiting sealing of settlement agreements filed with
the court); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-122 (2004) (voiding settlement agreement or provision concealing
environmental hazard); ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-18-401 (2004) (prohibiting govemmental agency from
agreeing to confidential settlement or seeking secrecy order concerning settlement terms); CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 128 (West Supp. 2006) (disfavoring stipulated reversal or vacatur of judgments); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 132-1.3 (West 2000) (restricting agencies of government or its subdivisions from
entering into confidential settlements without "overriding interest"); OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17.095
(West 2005) (prohibiting public body from entering into confidential settlement); S.C. R. Civ. P. 41.1
(establishing factors that courts should balance in deciding whether to seal settlement agreements); TEX.
R. Civ. P. 76a (creating presumption of public access to "court records" that include unfiled settlement
agreements and unfiled pretrial discovery that "have a probable adverse effect upon the general public
health or safety, or the administration of public office, or the operation of government").
93. Gambale, 377 F.3d at 140, 142 n.6.
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bound... to review any request to seal," even after the parties have
settled. 94
Thus, only "good cause" will justify the entry or continued mainte-
nance of any confidentiality order. A general interest in promoting settle-
ment will not alone constitute good cause. A court must additionally weigh
any particularized need for confidentiality (in achieving settlement or pro-
tecting legitimate personal or proprietary interests) against any countervail-
ing public interest in disclosure.95
Although legitimate public interests may be difficult to identify, sev-
eral categories commonly surface. For example, disputes involving a public
official, government entity, or the administration of public office implicate
a strong public interest in disclosure. 96 Access to these cases facilitates
public monitoring and accountability of the judiciary, as well as the gov-
ernment itself-a prime objective of federal and state freedom of informa-
tion, open meeting, and "right to know" laws. 97
Sunshine statutes and rules also frequently target settlements relevant
to public health, welfare, and safety. 98 Although admittedly ill-defined and
difficult to determine without prejudging the merits of a controversy, this
factor reflects a concern with the repeat player whose employment prac-
tices, defective products, deceptive trade violations, or other alleged mis-
conduct affects persons other than the immediate parties, including other
94. Id. at 141 (quoting Citizens First Nat'l Bank v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir.
1999)).
95. See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 786-88 (3d Cir. 1994).
96. A number of the sunshine statutes focus exclusively on settlements by public or government
entities. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-18-401 (prohibiting governmental agency from agreeing to confi-
dential settlement or seeking secrecy order concerning settlement terms); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 132-
1.3 (restricting government agencies from entering confidential settlements without "overriding inter-
est"); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.095 (precluding public entity from entering confidential settlement);
S.C. R. CIv. P. 41.1 (c) (prohibiting court from sealing settlement of public body or institution).
97. A court may also determine whether the information for which court protection is sought is
otherwise accessible under the federal Freedom of Information Act or its state equivalent. Like the
presence of a government party, this related factor argues against granting any confidentiality order
absent compelling privacy interests. See Janice Toran, Secrecy Orders and Government Litigants: "A
Northwest Passage Around the Freedom of Information Act"?, 27 GA. L. REV. 121, 177, 180-81 (1992)
(cautioning courts to consider impact of confidentiality order on Freedom of Information requests);
Dor6, Settlement, supra note 2, at 809-10 (examining these related public interest factors).
98. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2004) (prohibiting concealment of public hazards);
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426 (C)-(E) (2005) (prohibiting protective order regarding discovery
or sealing of records if information relates to public hazard); TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a (creating presumption
of public access to "court records" that include unfiled settlement agreements and unfiled pretrial
discovery that "have a probable adverse effect upon the general public health or safety, or the admini-
stration of public office, or the operation of government"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.611 (West
2005) (restricting confidentiality provisions in court order or private agreement that involve product
liability or hazardous substance claims).
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employees, consumers, communities, or markets. 99 A confidentiality order
in such cases may "deny similarly situated plaintiffs, potential victims,
regulatory authorities, or the media timely access to information regarding
a continuing hazard." 00
Finally, courts are especially reluctant to endorse any confidentiality
pact that suppresses evidence potentially relevant to other disputes. While
settling parties undoubtedly wish to shield themselves from future lawsuits
or additional liability, confidentiality clauses in a settlement cannot bind
persons not party to that compromise.10' Thus, one of the most compelling
reasons to modify or vacate a stipulated protective order is to permit the
sharing of relevant information and discovery with other litigants. 102 While
perhaps impeding the settlement of the case-at-hand, discovery sharing
fosters long-run efficiency and fairness by avoiding the needless duplica-
tion of discovery and its attendant unnecessary expense. 103 In a similar
vein, courts often hesitate to endorse or enforce confidentiality clauses that
"gag" settling parties from providing testimony or otherwise accessible
relevant evidence to other litigants or regulatory authorities.104
II. THE SECRET ENVIRONMENT OF ADR
Under traditional "bipolar" thinking, disputants choose between public
and private dispute resolution, with litigation and ADR presenting alterna-
tive fora for resolving controversies or vindicating rights. 105 The ability to
99. See Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 366 (D. Nev. 1993) (noting that public interest
grows more pressing as additional individuals are harmed by identical or similar action).
100. Dor6, Settlement, supra note 2, at 811.
101. See Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003) (suggesting
that parties have no entitlement to judicial protection from future litigation); Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at
367 (stating that confidentiality agreements "cannot bind parties who do not sign them").
102. See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1131 ("This court strongly favors access to discovery materials to meet
the needs of parties engaged in collateral litigation."). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (2001)
(providing that protective orders issued in personal injury or wrongful death cases shall not prohibit
sharing of discovery in similar or related matters).
103. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1131 (contending that discovery sharing "advances the interests of judicial
economy by avoiding the wasteful duplication of discovery").
104. See In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133-34 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(holding that confidentiality agreement signed by former employees did not preclude them from dis-
closing non-privileged information regarding defendant's wrongdoing); Kalinauskas, 151 F.R.D. at 365
(refusing to "condone the practice of 'buy[ing] the silence of a witness with a settlement agreement"');
United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 235, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (hesitating to "seal
existing evidence that would ordinarily be accessible to other litigants"); see also infra Parts III.A.3 and
B (examining discovery of confidential arbitrations and mediations).
105. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12, at 956 (rejecting such a bipolar view and
advocating a "unitary" theory of "binding public civil dispute resolution"). In Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held that
"[bly agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." See also Reuben,
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resolve a dispute in private with minimal public exposure motivates parties
to select ADR over litigation106 and has undoubtedly fueled its growing
popularity. 107 The opaque environment of ADR, as described below, how-
ever, raises concerns similar to those posed by court secrecy 08 and thus
jeopardizes legitimate public interests in disclosure.
A. Arbitration Confidentiality
1. Sources of Arbitration Confidentiality
As with virtually all aspects of ADR, the confidentiality of arbitration
rests upon principles of self-determination and party autonomy. 109 When
Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12, at 986 (stating that "ADR does not provide a day in court, but
rather an alternative to a day in court"); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the
Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BuFF. L. REV. 185, 209 (2004) (stating that "[a]rbitration is
simply an alternative method for resolving disputes and vindicating rights").
106. See Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Private Law, Public "Justice": Another Look at Privacy,
Arbitration, and Global E-Commerce, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 769, 771 (2000) (indicating that
"individuals choose arbitration solely in the hope of keeping some facts private"); Resnik, Procedure as
Contract, supra note 16, at 624 (suggesting that ADR "is often chosen because it has the advantage of
private decision making, made in the 'shadow' rather than in the light"); Reuben, Constitutional Grav-
ity, supra note 12, at 1086 (indicating that privacy is "an important consideration in the decision to
waive full-blown trial rights in favor of the arbitral forum"); Edward F. Sherman, Confidentiality in
ADR Proceedings: Policy Issues Arising from the Texas Experience, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 541, 561
(1997) [hereinafter Sherman, Confidentiality in ADR] (stating that ADR is "often touted as a means of
resolving disputes in private to avoid public exposure").
107. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405,
1409, 1412 (2002) (describing "increasing diversion" and "flight" to private dispute resolution);
Sherman, Confidentiality in ADR, supra note 106, at 542 (linking "spectacular rise" in ADR with
confidentiality of process); Weinstein & Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science, supra note 2, at 20
(suggesting that privacy may explain growing use and popularity of ADR).
108. See Gibbons, supra note 106, at 771 (noting that privacy of arbitral process and award is "one
of the elements of alternative dispute resolution that separates it from the public courts"); Dianne
LaRocca, The Bench Trial: A More Beneficial Alternative to Arbitration of Title VII Claims, 80 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 933, 936 (2005) (characterizing arbitration as "significantly more private and focused"
than public courtrooms); Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12, at 957 (distinguishing ADR
procedures that "operate outside of public view" from constitutional procedures designed to "assure
public witness").
109. ADR participants possess wide reign to design their dispute resolution process as they see fit.
See James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the
Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171, 173 (2001) (listing "party self-determination" and "volun-
tariness" as two core principles of mediation); Richard A. Bales, The Laissez-Faire Arbitration Market
and the Need for a Uniform Federal Standard Governing Employment and Consumer Arbitration, 52
U. KAN. L. REV. 583, 619 (2004) (criticizing laissez-faire approach that permits parties to stipulate to
whatever arbitration procedure they wish); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked
Problem of Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1199, 1200 (2000) [hereinafter
Cole, Managerial Litigants] (identifying party consent as the "nearly exclusive guiding principle for
process design"); Moohr, supra note 17, at 443 (arguing that all ADR models are "grounded on the
proposition that individual litigants should control and manage their suits"); Resnik, Procedure as
Contract, supra note 16, at 624 (noting that public benefits of ADR "are presumed to flow from the
reduction of conflict... predicated on the parties' preferences"). See also infra Part IV.B (questioning
whether party autonomy justifies arbitration confidentiality).
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parties waive litigation in favor of the arbitral forum, they also commonly
waive the openness of the courts for the secrecy of arbitration. Predispute
arbitration agreements frequently contain express confidentiality provi-
sions 110 or incorporate confidentiality by reference to specific arbitral
rules. 111 Most major dispute resolution organizations mandate the confi-
dentiality of arbitration proceedings' 1 2 and tout privacy as a selling point
for their services. 113 An arbitrator can bind the participants with a confiden-
110. In their study ofpre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, Professors Demaine and
Hensler found that 13.5% of the arbitration clauses examined required that some aspect of the arbitra-
tion be confidential. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
55, 69 (2004). See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) (confidentiality provision
required that "'[a]ny arbitration... remain confidential'); Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F.
Supp. 2d 862, 875 (D. Or. 2002) ("'Borrower and Lender agree that the arbitration proceedings are
confidential. The information disclosed in such proceedings cannot be used for any purpose in any other
proceeding."'); Acorn v. Household Int'l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (arbitra-
tion agreement required that "'award shall be kept confidential'); Zuver v. Airtouch Commc'ns., Inc.,
103 P.3d 753, 764 n.9 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) (arbitration agreement requiring that "'[a]ll arbitration
proceedings, including settlements and awards, under the Agreement will be confidential').
111. See, e.g., Parilla v. lAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 272 (3d Cir. 2004) (examin-
ing arbitration clause in employment contract that incorporated confidentiality provision by reference to
rules of American Arbitration Association). See also Gibbons, supra note 106, at 777 (describing
possible legal sources of arbitration privacy).
112. A survey of the rules of major ADR providers confirms the importance of confidentiality to
arbitration participants.
Rule 18 of the American Arbitration Association's ("AAA") National Rules for the Resolution
of Employment Disputes, for example, provides, "The arbitrator shall maintain the confidentiality of the
arbitration and shall have the authority to make appropriate rulings to safeguard that confidentiality,
unless the parties agree otherwise or the law provides to the contrary." American Arbitration Associa-
tion, National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22075
(last visited Feb. 15, 2006) [hereinafter AAA, Employment Rules].
Rule 26(a) of JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules & Procedures provides, "JAMS and the
Arbitrator shall maintain the confidential nature of the Arbitration proceeding and the Award, including
the Hearing, except as necessary in connection with a judicial challenge to or enforcement of an Award,
or unless otherwise required by law or judicial decision." JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION
SERVS., COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES 10 (2005),
http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/comprehensivearbitration-rules.pdf [hereinafter JAMS,
ARBITRATION RULES].
Rule 4 of the National Arbitration Forum ("NAF"), Code of Procedure, states,
Arbitration proceedings are confidential as permitted by law, unless all Parties agree other-
wise. Arbitration Orders and Awards are not confidential and may be disclosed by the Parties.
The Arbitrator and Forum may disclose case filings, case dispositions, and other case infor-
mation filed with the Forum as required by a Court Order.
NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE 5 (2005), http://arb-
forum.com/programs/codenew/2005code.pdf.
See also American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation
Procedures, Rule 23, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) [hereinafter
AAA, Commercial Rules] ("The arbitrator and the AAA shall maintain the privacy of the hearings
unless the law provides to the contrary."); ARBITRATION FORUMS, INC., SPECIAL ARBITRATION FORUM:
REFERENCE GUIDE 18 (2004), http://www.arbfile.org/afstatic/res/Downloads/
SpecialWorkbook/Revised SpecialWorkbook_2004.pdf ("All matters concerning an arbitration
proceeding shall be held in strict confidence" by AF, the arbitrator, and all participants.).
113. The confidentiality policy of Global Arbitration and Mediation Service, for instance, states,
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tiality order and sanction them for disclosures in violation of such order." 14
Thus, arbitration confidentiality is a creature of consent, particular institu-
tional rule, or specific arbitral order.
2. Scope of Arbitration Confidentiality
Given its contractualist nature, the scope of arbitration privacy varies
with the specific agreement, ADR service provider, and arbitrator. Gener-
ally, however, the arbitration process and its outcomes remain private.
Unlike the public courthouse, no set location for an arbitral proceeding
exists. 11 5 No open docket notifies the public or the media of the filing of an
arbitration claim or the existence of the dispute. 116 Discovery, if permitted,
is generally limited in scope and restricted to use only in the arbitration
proceedings. 1 7 Parties cannot share, and the public cannot access, evi-
dence, testimony, briefs, motions, and other information disclosed. 118
We at GAMS appreciate that confidentiality is one of the key reasons businesses select arbi-
tration or mediation to resolve disputes. Your privacy is important to us. The proprietary in-
formation of your business is important to us as well. We will do everything possible to keep
your business matters as confidential as possible.... We provide the most confidentiality as
possible, so you can resolve your dispute without regard to such considerations.
Global Arbitration and Mediation Service, Confidentiality Policy, http://www.globalarbitrationmedia-
tion.com/GAMSconfidentialitypolicy.shtml (last visited Jan. 26, 2006) The policy also states, "Our
rules and agreements prohibit the parties from discussing or releasing any information regarding the
conduct, content or the outcome of the mediation process or arbitration procedure." Id.
114. See JAMS, ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 112, at 10 (stating in Rule 26(b), "The Arbitrator
may issue orders to protect the confidentiality of proprietary information, trade secrets or other sensitive
information"); NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE, RULE 4 (1996) ("A Party who
improperly discloses confidential information shall be subject to sanctions."). Breach of a confidential-
ity obligation "may be relitigated before the same arbitrator[,] ... the source of future arbitrations,
or... a dependent or independent basis on which to commence proceedings in a state court." Gibbons,
supra note 106, at 777.
115. See AAA, Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 112, at Rule 22 (providing that "[tihe
arbitrator shall set the date, time, and place for each hearing").
116. See Brenowitz, supra note 10, at 682 (complaining that lack of arbitral docket prevents dis-
putes from coming to attention of "public's watchdogs").
117. An arbitration clause may prohibit discovery altogether and provide only for the exchange of
evidentiary materials prior to the hearing. See, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless
LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 164 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2004). If permitted, discovery in arbitration is much more
restricted than in litigation and occurs at the agreement of the parties or the discretion of the arbitrator.
See AAA, Employment Rules, supra note 112, at Rule 7 (conferring authority on arbitrator to order
discovery).
118. See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151 n.16 (agreement prohibited disclosure of the
contents of arbitration); Torrance Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 875 (2002) (borrower
agreed that information disclosed in arbitration with lender "cannot be used for any purpose in any
other proceeding"); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1182 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)
(agreement prohibited consumer from sharing information with anyone regarding subject matter of
arbitration).
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Without permission, the public cannot attend arbitral hearings, which are
generally open only to participants and their representatives. 19
Absent party agreement, the forum makes no transcript of the proceed-
ings. 120 Unless the rules of the arbitral forum so provide, the arbitrator is
not required to provide any written findings of fact, conclusions of law, or
explanation of the grounds for the award. 121 The award itself, which may
consist solely of a concise, unsupported disposition, is generally not pub-
licly filed, 122 and the parties may agree upon anonymity as well as confi-
119. See AAA, Employment Rules, supra note 112, at Rule 17 ("The arbitrator shall have the
authority to exclude witnesses, other than a party, from the hearing during the testimony of any other
witness. The arbitrator also shall have the authority to decide whether any person who is not a witness
may attend the hearing."); AAA, Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 112, at Rule 23 ("The
arbitrator and the AAA shall maintain the privacy of the hearings unless the law provides to the con-
trary. Any person having a direct interest in the arbitration is entitled to attend hearings. The arbitrator
shall otherwise have the power to require the exclusion of any witness, other than a party or other
essential person, during the testimony of any other witness. It shall be discretionary with the arbitrator
to determine the propriety of the attendance of any other person other than a party and its representa-
tives."); JAMS, ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 112, at 10 (stating in Rule 26(a), "JAMS and the
Arbitrator shall maintain the confidential nature of the Arbitration proceeding,... including the Hear-
ing"); id. (stating in Rule 26(c), "The Arbitrator may exclude any non-Party from any part of a
Hearing").
120. See AAA, Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 112, at Rule 26 (requiring that parties
procure stenographic record if desired); AAA, Employment Rules, supra note 112, at Rule 15 (requir-
ing that parties procure stenographic record if desired); JAMS, ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 112, at
9 (in Rule 22(k)(i) permitting any party to arrange and pay for stenographic record ); NAT'L
ARBITRATION FORUM, supra note 112, at 32 (stating in Rule 35(F) that "[n]o record of a Hearing shall
be kept unless agreed by all Parties or Ordered by the Arbitrator").
121. See Moohr, supra note 17, at 402 (stating that awards are not generally filed and "are simple
statements of the disposition of the claims that do not provide the reason for the award or an explana-
tion of the grounds supporting it"). But see AAA, Employment Rules, supra note 112, at Rule 34(c)
(requiring written reasons for award in employment dispute unless the parties agree otherwise).
122. Some arbitral rules do not regard arbitral awards themselves as confidential. See AAA, Em-
ployment Rules, supra note 112, at Rule 34(b) (making awards publicly available on a cost basis);
NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, supra note 112, at 5 (providing in Rule 4 that "Awards are not confiden-
tial and may be disclosed by the Parties"). In other cases, however, either arbitral rule or party agree-
ment will preclude public disclosure of the result of an arbitration, including the award. See, e.g.,
JAMS, ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 112, at 10 (in Rule 26(a) providing for confidentiality of
arbitration award); Demaine & Hensler, supra note 110, at 69 (describing several confidentiality clauses
in consumer arbitration agreements). See also Ting, 319 F.3d at 1151 n. 16 (prohibiting disclosure of the
result of arbitration or award); Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1180 (W.D.
Wash. 2002) (mandating that award be kept confidential); Acorn v. Household Int'l, Inc., 211 F. Supp.
2d 1160, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (requiring that award be kept confidential); Zuver v. Airtouch Commu-
nications, Inc., 103 P.3d 753, 764 n.9 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) (quoting arbitration clause that prevented
disclosure of"'[a]ll arbitration proceedings, including settlements and awards').
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dentiality. 123 Unless challenged on limited available grounds, the arbitral
award becomes final and not subject to any public review whatsoever. 
124
3. Arbitration Secrecy and the Public Interest
Under the currently entrenched view of the United States Supreme
Court, virtually all disputes, including those asserting statutory or public
rights, are subject to binding arbitration. 125 The Federal Arbitration Act
creates a strong public policy in favor of arbitration over litigation regard-
less of the claim or cause of action. 126 Thus, disputes involving employ-
ment discrimination, consumer protection, product liability, professional
malpractice, personal injury, securities fraud, and antitrust claims have all
been rerouted from litigation to the secret environment of arbitration. The
privacy of the arbitral forum exacerbates many of the frequently decried
problems associated with compelled arbitration of these claims.
a. Public Interest in Underlying Dispute
As previously discussed, in deciding whether to issue a protective,
confidentiality, or sealing order, courts in litigation balance the need for
privacy against any legitimate public interest in disclosure. 127 Disputes that
affect public health, welfare, and safety, including "flagrant product de-
fects, professional malpractice, or environmental pollution," would seem to
implicate a legitimate public interest whether resolved in a judicial or arbi-
123. For example, while the AAA National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes make
arbitral awards publicly available, the names of the parties and witnesses are not publicly available
"unless a party expressly agrees to have its name made public in the award." AAA, Employment Rules,
supra note 112, at Rule 34(b). See also Plaskett v. Bechtel Int'l., Inc., 243 F. Supp. 2d 334, 342-43
(D.V.I. 2003) (examining arbitration clause that prevented the inclusion of party name in arbitration
award if requested by the party).
124. See Moohr, supra note 17, at 402-03 (explaining how an arbitration award is "virtually final,"
given the nominal review permitted by federal arbitration statute). See also infra note 154 (examining
limited judicial review of arbitration proceedings and awards).
125. The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that a number of statutory claims vindi-
cating public rights are subject to arbitration, including employment discrimination, consumer, antitrust,
and securities claims. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (Truth In Lend-
ing Act/Equal Credit Opportunity Act); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)
(Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220
(1987) (RICO and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b)); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (Securities Act of 1933); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (Sherman Act).
126. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (holding that FAA manifests "liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements").
127. See supra Part 1.
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tral courtroom. 128 Workplace discrimination threatens a national public
policy broader than individual redress, and a dispute between employer and
employee may "belong[] to the public as well as to the parties."'1 29 Like-
wise, a standard consumer contract that is mass-marketed to "hundreds of
thousands or even millions of individuals" implicates "an inherent public
interest" in the interpretation and enforcement of its terms. 130 In permitting
the parties to shroud these matters, arbitration confidentiality perpetuates
public ignorance of continuing hazards, systemic problems, or public
needs.131
b. Isolation of Claimants
Relatedly, many have noted that the closed arbitral forum tends to fa-
vor the institutional "repeat player" over the "one-shot" participant.
132
Large employers, credit card companies, health providers, securities bro-
kers, banks, mortgage companies, and financial institutions all contract
with large numbers of similarly situated individuals who may all be af-
fected by the same practice, scheme, or course of conduct. An arbitration
clause isolates these individuals and forces them to resolve their dispute in
private. The confidentiality of the arbitral forum prevents other similarly
situated claimants from learning of the existence or substance of a dis-
pute. 133 Arbitral privacy can thus deprive existing and potential claimants
in litigation or arbitration of information and documents relevant to their
128. Sherman, A Process Model, supra note 14, at 1578-82 (suggesting need for states to consider
competing policies underlying confidentiality in ADR). See also Thornburg, supra note 17, at 276
(identifying personal injury claims as a type of dispute that belongs in a public forum).
129. Moohr, supra note 17, at 460.
130. Gibbons, supra note 106, at 784 (recommending reexamination of privacy in e-arbitration of
disputes arising out of mass-market contracts).
131. See id. at 788 (arguing that the private arbitral process shortcuts the "barometer of public
need"); Michael Moffitt, Pleadings in the Age of Settlement, 80 IND. L.J. 727, 755 (2005) (fearing secret
settlements may permit public ignorance of "trends that affect public health"); Stemlight & Jensen,
supra note 17, at 91 (commenting that press "cannot usually read and report on arbitration claims as
they do complaints filed in court"); Thornburg, supra note 17, at 272 (contending that privatization of
personal injury claims "can result in the public lacking information about important issues of health and
safety and product reliability").
132. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead. Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOc'y REv. 95, 97-104 (1974) (discussing repeat player advantages); Randall,
supra note 105, at 219 n.130 (suggesting that repeat arbitral players possess better ability to identify and
settle meritorious cases and to track and select arbitrators); Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note
16, at 668 (discussing "the power of repeat players ... to set the parameters of law's bargaining");
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12, at 1064-67 (discussing advantages that repeat players
may obtain concerning arbitrator selection).
133. See Moffitt, supra note 131, at 756 (asserting that confidentiality may prevent a product
liability plaintiff "from finding out if he or she is the only person ever to have a problem with [a]
device").
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claims, 134 and it can impede them from proving a pattern or practice or
intentional misconduct.135 This again contrasts with litigation, where the
sharing of information with similarly situated litigants frequently provides
compelling justification to modify or vacate a confidentiality order. 136
c. Arbitration Privacy and Collective Action
Arbitration confidentiality can work in tandem with another common
feature of arbitration agreements-the waiver of class actions-to further
impede cooperative resolution of similar claims against a common adver-
sary. 137 Arbitration agreements frequently prohibit class or collective ac-
tions in either litigation or arbitration. 138 Arbitration privacy precludes
information sharing among commonly aggrieved parties and the use of
knowledge gained in individual arbitration for the mutual aid of others.139
The prohibition on class and multiparty actions requires that claimants
arbitrate their grievances separately without the informational, financial, or
other incentives available in a collective action. This inability to share in-
formation and bring class actions can "greatly decrease the likelihood that
any claims will be filed."'140
134. See Alfini & McCabe, supra note 109, at 197 (contending that the public is "entitled to every
person's evidence"); Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 16, at 658-59 (discussing how ADR
can limit access to information and shelter documents from subsequent disclosure in litigation). But see
Eric J. Conn, Hanging in the Balance: Confidentiality Clauses and Postjudgment Settlements of Em-
ployment Discrimination Disputes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1562 (2000) (arguing that parties to settlement
of employment discrimination disputes should not be held "'hostage to some interest that is no concern
of [theirs]').
135. Randall, supra note 105, at 220 (contending that arbitration enables institutions to "minimize
information available to potential claimants" and impede them from building a case).
136. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text.
137. See generally Stemlight & Jensen, supra note 17, at 88-90 (marshalling arguments against the
waiver of class actions in arbitration agreements); John B. O'Keefe, Note, Preserving Collective-Action
Rights in Employment Arbitration, 91 VA. L. REV. 823, 826-28, 840 (2005) (proposing "open arbitra-
tion" to facilitate "concerted activity for mutual aid" in absence of class arbitrations); see also Luna v.
Household Fin. Corp. III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1179 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (holding that confidentiality
clause magnified the unfairness of the class action prohibition).
138. See Demaine & Hensler, supra note 110, at 65 (finding 30.8% of consumer arbitration clauses
studied explicitly prohibited class actions and none of clauses examined explicitly permitted class
actions); Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 17, at 75 (noting increasing number of arbitration clauses that
"prevent consumers from bringing class actions against [companies] in either litigation or arbitration").
When an arbitration agreement is silent as to class actions, the arbitrator will determine whether it
permits class arbitration. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003).
139. See O'Keefe, supra note 137, at 827-28 (contending that prohibition on employment class
actions could constitute illegal interference with concerted activity unless open arbitration is required).
140. Stemlight & Jensen, supra note 17, at 90. Professors Stemlight and Jensen level numerous
additional criticisms of arbitration clauses that waive consumer class actions, which the authors de-
scribe as "do-it-yourself tort reform." See id. at 85-91, 103. States differ as to the enforceability of class
action waivers in arbitration agreements. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456,
459 n.3 (Ct. App. 2005) (collecting conflicting authorities).
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Even if individual claims are confidentially arbitrated, the prohibition
on class actions effectively conceals entire disputes that would almost cer-
tainly be public if litigated in a judicial forum. 14 1 Class actions and other
representative suits "are of particular public interest because they affect
persons absent from the bargaining table, as well as the public-at-large."' 142
Accordingly, a "heavy burden" falls on those who would limit access to
class action litigation, 143 which carries a robust presumption of public
access. 144
d. No Publicly Accountable Guardian
In a class or collective action, the judge guards the best interests of the
absent class members and the general public. 145 No such guardian of the
class or public interest exists in the secret arbitration of individual
claims. 146 Indeed, an arbitrator charged with resolving a dispute arguably
owes duties only to the participants that retain and pay her. 147
141. See Stemlight & Jensen, supra note 17, at 90-91 (comparing widespread publicity accorded
even small claims in litigation with typically private arbitration).
142. Dor6, Settlement, supra note 2, at 807.
143. Friedenthal, supra note 2, at 75-76 (contending that absent class members cannot make "sea-
soned decision" if key information is kept secret).
144. See In re Cendant Corp., 260 F.3d 183, 194, 196 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying heightened scrutiny
to request to seal bids for class counsel); United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853,
856 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing court's "'larger role' . . . in the resolution through settlement of suits
'affecting the public interest'); FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408-09 (1st Cir.
1987) (holding that judicial approval of consent decree creates strong presumption of public access).
145. See Dor6, Settlement, supra note 2, at 807-08 (contending that the judge in a class action
"plays a role beyond resolution of the case at hand and serves as guardian of a broader public interest");
Natalie C. Scott, Note, Don't Forget Me! The Client in a Class Action Lawsuit, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 561, 578 (2002) (describing judges as guardians of the class and as responsible to the public).
146. See Brenowitz, supra note 10, at 700 (contrasting class actions with arbitration where no
neutral gatekeeper weighs the public interest).
Several ADR providers now offer class arbitrations. See, e.g., JUDICIAL ARBITRATION &
MEDIATION SERVS., CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES (2005), http://www.jams-
endispute.com/images/PDF/JAMS Class ActionProcedures.doc. At least one of these providers
recognizes the need for open arbitration of class claims. For example, Rule 9(a) of the AAA, Supple-
mentary Rules for Class Arbitrations, provides,
The presumption of privacy and confidentiality in arbitration proceedings shall not apply in
class arbitrations. All class arbitration hearings and filings may be made public, subject to the
authority of the arbitrator to provide otherwise in special circumstances. However, in no event
shall class members, or their individual counsel, if any, be excluded from the arbitration
hearings.
American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations,
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936 (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).
147. See In re [Sealed], 64 F. Supp. 2d 183, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that "[c]ourts have obli-
gations to the public that private arbitrators do not"); Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 116 1,
1181 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing that "generally arbitration forums should be treated differently
from courts"). But see American Arbitration Association, Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes, Preamble, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21958 (last visited Feb. 15, 2006) ("Persons who act
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Like courts, an arbitrator possesses substantial and "broad judicial
powers" to conduct proceedings and enforce arbitral orders. 148 Like courts,
arbitrators increasingly interpret, apply, and enforce antidiscrimination,
consumer protection, and other statutory rights that vindicate important
public values and goals. 149 In litigation, the presumption of access operates
to ensure the public accountability of judges. 150 In contrast, the confidenti-
ality of arbitration insulates the arbitral decision maker, who already pos-
sesses largely unchecked discretion, from similar public scrutiny and
oversight.151
e. Inaccessible Results and Reasoning
As previously discussed, arbitral proceedings are not publicly dock-
eted and are generally closed to non-participants. Unless requested by the
parties, arbitrators are not required to issue written, reasoned opinions or to
publish their awards or decisions. 152 Confidentiality thus conceals an arbi-
trator's track record and prejudices other potential parties, as well as the
public in general.
"One-shot" participants cannot easily or inexpensively access infor-
mation concerning arbitrator bias, misconduct, or conflicts of interest nec-
as commercial arbitrators therefore undertake serious responsibilities to the public, as well as to the
parties.").
148. According to Professor Reuben, "Arbitrators are often statutorily vested with broad judicial
powers to administer depositions and discovery, including subpoena and sanction powers. In addition,
arbitrators often receive the same 'judicial' immunity from civil liability that is reserved exclusively for
the states' own constitutionally authorized judiciary." Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12, at
1005-06.
149. See infra Part II.A.3.f for a discussion of how confidentiality impedes the deterrent, declara-
tive, and normative functions of employment and consumer laws.
150. Public oversight of judges and judicial work product serves as a principal rationale for open
courts. See supra Part I.A.
151. As observed by Professor Reuben, "Transparency is closely aligned with accountability as a
democratic value because it is transparency that makes accountability possible by permitting witness to
government actions." Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem ofArbitra-
tion, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 289 (2004) [hereinafter Reuben, Democracy]. For a discussion
of the limited judicial review applicable to arbitration, see infra note 154.
152. Without a reasoned opinion explaining the bases of an arbitral award, even the parties them-
selves will be left in the dark concerning the decision's rationale. For that reason, some arbitral rules
either require or permit written and reasoned awards in certain cases. See AAA, Employment Rules,
supra note 112, at Rule 34(c) (requiring arbitrator to "provide written reasons for the award unless the
parties agree otherwise"); AAA, Commercial Arbitration Rules, supra note 112, at Rule 42(b) (stating
that "arbitrator need not render a reasoned award unless the parties request such an award.., or unless
the arbitrator determines that a reasoned award is appropriate"); NAT'L ARBITRATION FORUM, supra
note 14, at Rule 37(G) ("An award shall not include any reasons, findings of fact or conclusions of law
unless required by prior written agreement of the parties."); JAMS, ARBITRATION RULES, supra note
112, at 9 (stating in Rule 24(g) that "[u]nless all Parties agree otherwise, the Award shall also contain a
concise written statement of the reasons for the Award").
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essary for an informed selection of arbitrators. 153 Moreover, the public
cannot assure itself that the increasing number of employment and con-
sumer cases being diverted into arbitration are being resolved fairly and in
the public interest. Although participants can sue to enforce or vacate an
arbitral award, judicial review is limited to arbitrator misconduct and does
not encompass misunderstanding or misapplication of the law or facts.
154
And, even this limited oversight will not occur if the participants never
challenge the award in court. 155 Secrecy thus hampers accountability and
jeopardizes public confidence in the arbitral process itself.
156
f Confidentiality and Broader Policy Objectives
Finally, the secrecy of arbitration contributes to a broader concern that
arbitration itself cannot vindicate important deterrent, declarative, and
normative policies underlying various public rights. Professor Moohr has
articulated this concern with respect to the arbitration of employment
claims:
Litigation of employment discrimination claims generates several en-
forcement mechanisms that are integral to securing the end of workplace
discrimination. First, judicial decisions, which speak with the authority
of the state, provide general deterrence of future violators. Second, the
courts develop and refine the law of employment discrimination, estab-
lish precedents, and define a uniform standard. Finally, the judicial proc-
ess educates the community and forms public values, a crucial
153. See Brenowitz, supra note 10, at 696-97 (arguing that inability to scrutinize work of mediators
and arbitrators conceals conflicts of interest and improper behavior); Gibbons, supra note 106, at 787
(contending that the publication of awards checks arbitral abuse); Moohr, supra note 17, at 453 (propos-
ing that pubic scrutiny permits employees to access information concerning arbitration and arbitrators).
Indeed, this information asymmetry has led some courts to invalidate as unconscionable arbitration
confidentiality provisions. See infra Part III.A. L.a.
154. The grounds set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") or state laws patterned on the
Uniform Arbitration Act are limited to situations involving arbitrator fraud, misconduct, evident partial-
ity, or ultra vires acts. See FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 23 (2000). Case law
suggests that a court can also vacate an award that is in "manifest disregard of the law." See First Op-
tions of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (stating that "parties [are] bound by [an] arbitra-
tor's decision not in 'manifest disregard' of the law"); see also Cole, Managerial Litigants, supra note
109, at 1233-35 (discussing judicial review of arbitration); LaRocca, supra note 108, at 940 (stating
that standards for review "ensure a high degree of judicial deference to arbitrators"); Moohr, supra note
17, at 450 (noting that arbitration awards are "virtually final" given "quite narrow" grounds for judicial
review); Reuben, Democracy, supra note 12, at 300 (describing limited substantive review of arbitral
decisions); Thornburg, supra note 17, at 266 (noting that only "'manifest disregard' of the law" will
justify vacating an arbitral award).
155. See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the limited opportunities courts possess to police arbi-
tration confidentiality.
156. See Gibbons, supra note 106, at 787 (arguing that publication of arbitral awards will promote
the appearance of fairness and develop public confidence in arbitral system); Thornburg, supra note 17,




undertaking when a law seeks to change public sentiment. Arbitration,
because it is a nongovernmental, confidential, and final forum, does not
generate these enforcement mechanisms; thus, it is less effective in
achieving the public policy objective [of ending employment
discrimination]. 157
Others level much the same criticism concerning the arbitration of
consumer and personal injury claims. 158
g. Need for Scrutiny
Whether arbitration can effectuate broader social policies lies beyond
the scope of this Article. Arguably, the United States Supreme Court fore-
closed these wholesale criticisms when it held that arbitration can serve
remedial and deterrent functions. 159 Without public knowledge of a dispute
or its resolution, however, prospective violators cannot fully appreciate the
costs of engaging in prohibited conduct. 160 A private arbitral decision af-
fects only the conduct of the participants and cannot guide the primary
behavior of others. Unlike publicly available court decisions, unpublished
arbitral awards do not communicate public values or educate the commu-
nity about the underlying law. Perhaps enough of these cases will continue
to be litigated so as to fulfill these normative and declarative functions.
Because the privacy of arbitration does impede these public purposes, how-
ever, the narrower issue of confidentiality deserves separate and closer
scrutiny.
157. Moohr, supra note 17, at 400.
158. See Gibbons, supra note 106, at 793 (contending that transparency in consumer arbitrations
will serve important public purposes); Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12, at 1014 (recog-
nizing that arbitration negates "any possibility that the dispute's resolution will have any public educa-
tional or deterrent value"); Thornburg, supra note 17, at 255, 270-73 (contending that mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration of personal injury claims "threatens the retributive, economic, and communitarian
goals of tort law" and "[a]t the extreme,... could make all tort policy considerations disappear alto-
gether"). But see Conn, supra note 134, at 1568-72 (questioning assumption that ADR thwarts public
policy goals of Title VII).
159. In affirming the arbitrability of age discrimination claims, the Court in Gilmer v. Inter-
state/Johnson Lane Corp. held that "[s]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his
or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial
and deterrent function." 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1990) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)). Professor Moohr criticizes the Court's assumption, arguing
that it subsumes the broader goal of ending workplace discrimination "into the more limited goal of
ensuring that individuals obtain a remedy for a discrimination injury, thus crediting only one public
policy." Moohr, supra note 17, at 418.
160. See Moohr, supra note 17, at 431 (asserting that public knowledge enables the public to
"calculate the costs and benefits of engaging in the prohibited conduct"); Thornburg, supra note 17, at
270 (commenting that arbitration decreases the deterrent value of tort law).
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B. Confidentiality in Mediation and Court-Connected ADR
Confidentiality in arbitration is frequently justified by analogy to its
use in private negotiation, mediation, and other court-based bargaining. 161
The nature and rationale for privacy in these non-binding, non-adjudicatory
forms of ADR thus helps to elucidate its propriety in arbitration, as well as
ADR in general. 162 Moreover, although confidentiality in settlement-
focused ADR like mediation may be appropriate, 163 absolute or overly
broad confidentiality, even in mediation, "may result in an untenable 'loss
of information to the public and the justice system."' 1 64
1. Confidentiality of Mediation and Court-Sponsored ADR
The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 (the "ADR Act") re-
quires federal district courts to authorize the use of alternative dispute reso-
lution in all civil cases and to implement their own alternative dispute
resolution programs. 165 Courts today actively promote the private settle-
ment of disputes, which has become an increasingly important judicial
function. 166 Courts thus routinely encourage and frequently mandate that
litigants participate in ADR processes designed to avoid adjudication
through consensual resolution of disputes. 167 Court-connected ADR takes
161. See infra notes 280-81 and accompanying text. See also Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928
(7th Cir. 2002) (comparing private settlement agreements to "most arbitration awards").
162. Because arbitration is the form of ADR that most resembles litigation, see infra Part IV.C.1,
this article focuses primarily upon the confidentiality of arbitration and its contrast with litigation.
163. See infra Part IV.C.2.
164. In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 637 (4th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
165. The ADR Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (2000), reflects the strong federal policy favoring alterna-
tive dispute resolution. That Act requires every federal judicial district to "devise and implement its
own alternative dispute resolution program ... to encourage and promote the use of alternative dispute
resolution ..." Id. § 65 1(b). Each ADR program must include "at least one alternative dispute resolu-
tion process, including, but not limited to, mediation, early neutral evaluation, minitrial, and [voluntary]
arbitration." Id. § 652(a). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5), (c)(9) (making facilitation of settlement a
proper purpose and subject of pretrial conference).
166. As recognized by the Second Circuit,
There is no question that fostering settlement is an important Article III function of the federal
district courts. Every case must be dropped, settled or tried, and a principal function of a trial
judge is to foster an atmosphere of open discussion among the parties' attorneys and represen-
tatives so that litigation may be settled promptly and fairly so as to avoid the uncertainty, ex-
pense and delay inherent in a trial.
United States v. Glens Falls Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 856 (2d. Cir. 1998). For an examination of
judicial involvement in settlement, see generally Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 2, at 288-95
(exploring the shift in judicial activity from adjudication to settlement); Dor6, Settlement, supra note 2,
at 823-26 (examining whether increased judicial participation in settlement implicates the right of
public access to judicial proceedings).
167. See Alfini & McCabe, supra note 109, at 172-73 (examining increase in court-sponsored or
officially-mandated mediation programs); Cole, Managerial Litigants, supra note 109, at 1199-1203
(describing adoption of mediation and arbitration within confines of traditional litigation system);
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many forms, including settlement conferences, summary jury trials, early
neutral evaluation, non-binding arbitration, and mediation.168
Courts, commentators, and legislators collectively assume that a
closed and confidential bargaining forum is essential to the smooth and
effective functioning of those processes. 169 Without some assurance of
confidentiality, litigants might be reluctant to fully and candidly state their
positions, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of their cases, or make the
admissions or concessions necessary to a desired compromise. 170
Notwithstanding the presumption of public access to judicial proceed-
ings and records, then, the confidentiality of even court-sponsored ADR is
widely recognized and protected. The ADR Act directs that district courts
enact local rules that "provide for the confidentiality of... alternative dis-
pute resolution processes and to prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute
resolution communications." 171 Courts thus generally deny the press and
public access to court-supervised ADR proceedings like settlement confer-
Moffitt, supra note 131, at 728 (asserting that "courts regularly encourage parties to resolve disputes
extra-judicially").
168. See generally Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12 (discussing potential state action
in various court-sponsored adjudicative, consensual, and advisory ADR processes); Stemlight, Separate
and Not Equal, supra note 16, at 692-94 (contending that "court-connected ADR... dominate[s] the
work of some courts").
169. See, e.g., Alfini & McCabe, supra note 109, at 194 (contending that "confidentiality is an
essential element of mediation"); Deason, Complementary Systems, supra note 14, at 563-65 (examin-
ing need for confidentiality in mediation); Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12, at 1099
(characterizing confidentiality as one of the "cornerstones" of the process); Sherman, A Process Model,
supra note 14, at 1578 (describing confidentiality as a "canon of faith" for mediators). But see Orna
Rabinovich-Einy, Going Public: Diminishing Privacy in Dispute Resolution in the Internet Age, 7 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 39 (2002) (questioning whether confidentiality is indispensable to mediation process).
170. In recognizing a federal common law settlement privilege, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reiterated the importance of "secrecy of matters discussed ... during settlement negotiations":
In order for settlement talks to be effective, parties must feel uninhibited in their communica-
tions. Parties are unlikely to propose the types of compromises that most effectively lead to
settlement unless they are confident that their proposed solutions cannot be used on cross ex-
amination, under the ruse of "impeachment evidence," by some future third party. Parties
must be able to abandon their adversarial tendencies to some degree. They must be able to
make hypothetical concessions, offer creative quid pro quos, and generally make statements
that would otherwise belie their litigation efforts.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir. 2003). See also
Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979) (cautioning that
without confidentiality, counsel will "conduct themselves in a cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal
manner more suitable to poker players in a high-stakes game than to adversaries attempting to arrive at
a just resolution of civil dispute").
171. 28 U.S.C.A. § 652(d) (West Supp. 2005). See also Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5
U.S.C.A. § 574(a) (West Supp. 2005) (protecting neutrals from the voluntary or compelled disclosure or
discovery of "any dispute resolution communication or any communication provided in confidence to
the neutral").
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ences and summary jury trials, even in cases involving government action
or issues of public significance. 1
72
2. The Mediation Privilege
Confidentiality does not necessarily create an evidentiary privilege,
however. 173 Although compromise discussions may be inadmissible, they
are still theoretically discoverable, at least upon a showing of sufficient
relevance and need.174 The potential discoverability of ADR-related infor-
mation has prompted many jurisdictions to confer additional confidential
protection on at least one type of ADR proceeding through the creation of a
mediation privilege. 17
5
The rationale for such a privilege stems from the fact that successful
mediation requires a consensual outcome. Unlike arbitrators or judges, the
neutral mediator does not adjudicate; he does not impose a decision on the
parties or dictate an outcome. 176 Mediation is a consensual process and the
mediator merely assists the parties to resolve their dispute. Although they
may be compelled to mediate, the parties themselves choose whether to
settle or to continue to litigate. 177 Because of its emphasis on conciliation
172. See, e.g., In re Cincinnati Enquirer, 94 F.3d 198 (6th Cir. 1996) (denying newspaper access to
summary jury trial in class action arising from prison riots); B.H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d 294 (7th Cir.
1995) (upholding court's decision to hold closed in-chambers conferences to discuss implementation of
consent decree in suit brought by Illinois Department of Children and Family Services); Cincinnati Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 903 (6th Cir. 1988) (denying press access to summary jury
trial in case involving nuclear power and utility rate issues); United States v. Town of Moreau, 979 F.
Supp. 129 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying media access to settlement conferences and position papers in
CERCLA lawsuit involving town water supply).
173. The ADR Act does not create any evidentiary privilege. See FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d
736, 738 (N.D. Tex. 1999); Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
See also Pearson v. Miller, 211 F.3d 57, 68 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that "[s]tatutory provisions providing
for duties of confidentiality do not automatically imply the creation of evidentiary privileges binding on
the courts").
174. Although Federal Rule of Evidence 408 makes "[e]vidence of conduct or statements made in
compromise negotiations" inadmissible, it does not create an evidentiary privilege or restrict the dis-
coverability of settlement information. FED. R. EVID. 408. See In re Subpoena Issued to Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 370 F. Supp. 2d 201, 211 (D.D.C. 2005); In re RDM Sports Group, Inc., 277
B.R. 415, 433 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002). Jurisdictions differ as to whether they require a showing of
exceptional circumstances to justify discovery of settlement information. See SARAH R. COLE ET AL.,
MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE § 9:7 (2d ed. 2005) (stating that some courts "require more of
the party seeking to discover compromise discussions than they require of others").
175. See COLE ET AL., supra note 174, § 9:2 (describing assumption underlying privilege as belief
that "there is something special about mediation that warrants a broader exclusion than is provided for
compromise discussions without a mediator").
176. See Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12, at 1049 (describing court-related media-
tion as "different in kind from arbitration and trial" because it is "consensual in nature" and because the
mediator lacks "coercive authority to decide cases").
177. For an examination of mediation law and practice, see generally COLE ET AL., supra note 174.
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and consensus, effective mediation (like settlement) depends upon confi-
dentiality. 17
8
In recognition of this need, nearly all states have adopted a mediation
privilege of one type or another. 179 Several federal courts similarly recog-
nize a federal common law privilege against discovery of information dis-
closed in conjunction with mediation proceedings. 180 And in an effort to
promote consistency, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws ("NCCUSL") recently approved the Uniform Mediation
Act (the "UMA"), which creates a privilege for mediation communications
and prevents their discovery or admission into evidence. 181
Although jurisdictions widely differ concerning its scope, conditions,
and exceptions, the mediation privilege permits participants to refuse to
disclose or prevent others from disclosing matters provided in connection
with a mediation proceeding. 182 The privilege is intended to encourage
mediation by fostering frank and honest discussions among mediation par-
ticipants without fear that adverse information presented during a media-
178. See State v. Williams, 877 A.2d 1258, 1266 (N.J. 2005) (noting that "[s]uccessful mediation,
with its emphasis on conciliation, depends on confidentiality perhaps more than any other form of
ADR"); Foxgate Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Bramalea Cal., Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1126 (Cal. 2001)
(holding that "confidentiality is essential to effective mediation").
179. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2238(B)-(E) (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206
(2004); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1115-1128, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/calawquery?codesection=evid&codebody=&hits=20; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(3) (West 2003);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 23C (West 2000); MINN.
STAT. § 595.02 (2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1805 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.785 (West
2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5949 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-44 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 19-13-32 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-4-130 (2002); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 154.052(c), available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/statutes/cp.toc.htm; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
576.10 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.070 (1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-103 (2005). See also
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT Prefatory Note (2001) (indicating that "state legislatures have enacted more than
250 mediation privilege statutes").
180. See In re RDM Sports Group, Inc., 277 B.R. 415, 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002); Sheldone v.
Pa. Turnpike Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 517 (W.D. Pa. 2000); Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pen-
sion & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd, 216 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000).
181. NCCUSL approved the UMA in 2001. To date, however, only six states and the District of
Columbia have adopted the UMA. See Council B16-0145, 2005 Council Period 16 (2005) (enacted as
Act A16-0273; transmitted to Congress for approval, Feb. 6, 2006); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1 to 35/99
(2005); IOWA CODE § 679 C (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2930 to 2942 (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:23C-1 to -13 (West Supp. 2005); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2710.01 to 2710.10 (West 2005);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.07.010 to 7.07.080 (2005). But see NCCUSL Act Search Results,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ActSearchResults.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2006) (noting that in 2005-
06, the UMA has been introduced in the legislatures of District of Columbia, Massachusetts, New York,
Utah, and Vermont).
182. The UMA, for example, provides that "[a] [mediation] party may refuse to disclose, and may
prevent any other person from disclosing, a mediation communication." UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 5
(2001). See also COLE ET AL., supra note 174, § 9:10 (discussing wide variance among jurisdictions
concerning the privilege and the uncertainty as to what proceedings qualify as a "mediation").
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tion could be used against participants in subsequent litigation. 183 It thus
aims at preventing compelled disclosure of mediation-related matters in
judicial proceedings. To that extent, the privilege encourages mediation,
while potentially sacrificing information relevant to other controversies or
of significant public interest.
3. Overbroad and Unqualified Protection?
Privileges differ as to whether they afford absolute or qualified ADR
confidentiality. Absolute privileges "apply regardless of the need for the
evidence in a particular case," while qualified privileges permit "a case by
case balancing of the individual case need [for evidence] against the public
policies favoring nondisclosure."'1 84 A recent decision from California il-
lustrates the overly broad protection afforded by an absolute mediation
privilege.
In Rojas v. Superior Court, several hundred tenants living in mold-
infested apartments sued their landlord for fraudulent concealment.185 Sev-
eral years before, the landlord had sued the building's contractors concern-
ing the very same condition and, after court-ordered mediation,
confidentially settled that prior suit. By the time the tenants discovered that
they had been exposed to toxic mold and had sued the landlord, the mold
and water leakage had been remediated and the buildings repaired. The
tenants thus sought to discover information concerning the prior condition
of the building and the existence and amount of any mold, including photo-
graphs, videotapes, witness statements, and raw data from destructive test-
ing of physical samples collected by the landlord at the complex. 186 The
landlord argued that the California mediation privilege prohibited disclo-
sure of this information because it had been "prepared for the purpose of, in
183. See In re RDM Sports Group, Inc., 277 B.R. at 430 (noting belief that mediation privilege
encourages settlements and that mediation has "flourished" because of confidentiality); Sheldone, 104
F. Supp. 2d at 514 (predicting that participants "would be reluctant to lay their cards on the table"
without mediation privilege); Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (reasoning that lack of privilege gives
participants "incentive ... to withhold sensitive information in mediation or refuse to participate at
all"). See generally COLE ET AL., supra note 174, § 9:2 (discussing policy rationales for mediation
privilege).
184. COLE ET AL., supra note 174, § 9:10, at 9:25. See also Maureen A. Weston, Confidentiality's
Constitutionality: The Incursion on Judicial Powers to Regulate Party Conduct in Court-Connected
Mediation, 8 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 29, 49 (2003) (contrasting "blanket confidentiality" with "quali-
fied confidentiality" that recognizes "judicial discretion to order disclosure in individual cases where
needed to prevent a manifest injustice or to enforce court orders").
185. 93 P.3d 260, 262 (Cal. 2004).
186. Id. at 270.
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the course of, or pursuant to" the court-ordered mediation of his prior suit
against the contractors. 187
The tenants could not duplicate much of the requested information and
thus arguably possessed substantial need for the evidence. Nevertheless, the
California Supreme Court rejected any "good cause" exception to the privi-
lege, which "unqualifiedly bars disclosure" of mediation-related communi-
cations "absent an express statutory exception."' 188 Thus, no showing of
substantial need or undue hardship justifies discovery of information so
long as it is prepared for the purpose or in the course of mediation. 189 The
privilege absolutely protects factual materials like photographs, videotapes,
and raw data even if they do not reflect attorney strategy or mental impres-
sions. 190
Like most similar privileges, the California mediation privilege does
not immunize "otherwise discoverable" material from disclosure merely
because it is introduced or used in mediation proceedings. 191 Theoretically,
then, the privilege covers only material that would not exist but for the
mediation and will not prevent discovery of preexisting facts or docu-
ments. 192 Rojas illustrates, however, the difficulty in determining whether
information is prepared for mediation or litigation, especially when litiga-
tion and mediation proceed simultaneously. Indeed, in Rojas, the landlord's
lawsuit against the contractors had been pending for almost two years be-
fore the parties were ordered to mediate. The landlord likely prepared at
187. The California mediation privilege prevents discovery or admission of communications or
writings that are "prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation." CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1119, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/calawquery?codesection=evid&codebody-&hits=20.
188. Rojas, 93 P.3d at 270-71 (emphasis in original).
189. Id. at 271 (remanding to determine whether any of the requested materials had been "prepared
for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to" the mediation).
190. The Rojas court refused to distinguish between derivative or non-derivative information or
equate the mediation privilege to the more qualified protection afforded work product. Id. at 270. Cf.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (providing that party may obtain discovery of work product upon showing of
"substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means"). The
mediation privilege further differs from work product in that it protects documents produced to one's
adversary. See In re RDM Sports Group, Inc., 277 B.R. 415,432 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2002).
191. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1120(a), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/calawquerycodesection=evid&codebody=&hits=20 (providing that "[e]vidence otherwise admissi-
ble or subject to discovery outside of a mediation... shall not be or become inadmissible or protected
from disclosure solely by reason of its introduction or use in a mediation").
192. The Rojas court recognized that the mediation privilege thus did not protect the facts set forth
in witness statements or any physical samples that still existed. 93 P.3d at 270 n.8. See also In re RDM
Sports Group, Inc., 277 B.R. at 430 (stating that mediation privilege does not protect information that
would not have come into being absent mediation); Sheldone v. Pa. Turnpike Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d
511, 515 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (noting that privilege does not justify concealing facts or documents that
existed independent of mediation).
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least some of the requested tests, photos, and reports in anticipation of the
pending litigation or for joint use in both proceedings. An absolute privi-
lege provides even more protection than work product and gives partici-
pants incentive to use mediation as a shield for unfavorable evidence.
Rojas also raises concerns similar to those levied against litigation
confidentiality. Does the rationale underlying a broad, unqualified privi-
lege-the desire to encourage mediation and settlement-justify the con-
cealment of information potentially relevant to mediation participants,
other litigants, and the general public? 193 In litigation, party autonomy and
the policy favoring settlement often yield to the public interest in disclo-
sure. The desire for settlement alone will not support a protective or sealing
order if confidentiality jeopardizes the discovery rights of third parties or
conceals information relevant to public health and safety. 194 Rojas impli-
cates both these counterweights. Yet confidentiality will prevail, without
any balancing of competing interests, simply because the information is
produced for purposes of mediation.
As discussed below, no clear dividing line separates litigation from
mediation, particularly when courts sponsor, encourage, and even require
mediation of litigated disputes. 195 And, although Rojas concerned a privi-
lege particular to mediation, 196 at least one other court has extended privi-
lege protection to less structured settlement activities, whether "done under
the auspices of the court or informally between the parties."'197 Privileges
193. A recent California appellate court decision illustrates how an unqualified mediation privilege
can result in the non-disclosure of information of general public interest. In Doe I v. Superior Court,
the court cited Rojas to prevent public disclosure of written summaries of the personnel files of numer-
ous priests accused of sexually molesting minors. 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 248, 249, 251 (Ct. App. 2005).
Because the summaries were prepared by the Los Angeles Diocese in connection with the mediation of
civil litigation against the church, even the Diocese itself could not disclose them over the objection of
the priests who participated in the mediation. Id. at 249.
194. See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., Doe 1, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 252 (recognizing "the conceptual difficulties in distin-
guishing between a mediation and a settlement conference when a bench officer is presiding at those
talks"). See also Jeffrey J. Lauderdale, A New Trend in the Law of Privilege: The Federal Settlement
Privilege and the Proper Use of Federal Rule of Evidence 501 for the Recognition of New Privileges,
35 U. MEM. L. REv. 255, 310-12 (2005) (predicting that settlement privilege will apply to other forms
of ADR and protect "anything that reasonably can be construed" as settlement negotiations).
196. Some courts have narrowly construed the mediation privilege and confined it to formal media-
tion proceedings before a neutral. See, e.g., In re RDM Sports Group, Inc., 277 BR. at 431 (noting that
privilege does not shelter documents prepared prior to mediation); Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pen-
sion & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (holding that mediation privilege does
not cover post-mediation communications); Saeta v. Superior Court, II Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 617 (Ct.
App. 2004) (refusing to extend privilege to termination review panel in wrongful discharge case).
197. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 979-80 (6th
Cir. 2003) (recognizing a broader federal common law privilege for settlement communications); see
also Allen County v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 197 F.R.D. 352, 353 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (denying access to
privileged settlement negotiations with county regarding environmental clean-up); Cook v. Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 554 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (recognizing a "well established privilege
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"are in derogation of the search for truth"'198 because they prevent the dis-
closure of relevant evidence and impede accurate resolution of controver-
sies. Because a significant number of litigated disputes do eventually settle,
an unqualified privilege like that in Rojas could operate too broadly in
some cases and undercut judicial regulation of even litigation
confidentiality.
III. ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE ADR SECRECY
A number of concerns surround the confidentiality of ADR in disputes
that implicate interests broader than, and in addition to, the resolution of
the dispute at hand. For the most part, however, little legislative or judicial
attention has been paid to these concerns. Instead, the desire to facilitate the
private settlement of disputes, 199 the push to promote non-judicial, alterna-
tive dispute resolution,200 and the correspondingly weighty federal policy
favoring arbitration,201 have caused many courts to enforce (perhaps rou-
tinely) the confidentiality of both arbitration and mediation. 202 Party auton-
omy, rather than public interest in disclosure, controls the existence and
scope of arbitration privacy. And the parties' purported need for confiden-
tiality in negotiating and achieving settlement justifies extensive protection
of all information communicated during mediation. Recently, however, a
relating to settlement discussions"). But see In re Gen. Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594
F.2d 1106, 1124 n.20 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding "no convincing basis" for settlement negotiations privi-
lege); In re Subpoena Issued to Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n., 370 F. Supp. 2d 201, 210
(D.D.C. 2005) (finding no "consensus of support for a settlement privilege in federal court"). For an
examination of the settlement privilege, see generally Lauderdale, supra note 195, at 290-96 (discuss-
ing and agreeing with Goodyear); Michael D. Moberly, The Discoverability of Severance Agreements
in Wrongful Discharge Litigation, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 14-24 (2002) (supporting at least a
qualified privilege against discovery of settlement evidence).
198. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
199. For a discussion of the strong public policy favoring the private settlement of disputes, see
generally Dor&, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 2, at 290-92 (discussing how procedural rules "promote
private settlement from the outset of a civil lawsuit through its appeal").
200. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (discussing ADR Act's promotion of court-
sponsored ADR).
201. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983),
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-13, "establishes that, as a
matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor
of arbitration."
202. A New York district court recently expressed this sentiment: "[P]rotecting confidentiality
agreements.., promotes federal policy and encourages ADR by ensuring that parties in an arbitration
proceeding get the protections for which they contracted." Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Cunningham
Lindsey Claims Mgmt., Inc., Nos. 03CV0531, 03CV1625 (DLI)(MLO), 2005 WL 1522783, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2005). See also Parilla v. IPA Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269 (3d Cir.
2004) (upholding confidentiality clause of consumer arbitration agreement); Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc.
v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004) (same); Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260,
270-71 (Cal. 2004) (rejecting "good cause" exception to mediation privilege).
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few courts have attempted to regulate ADR confidentiality using the lim-
ited opportunities and means available to them.
A. Arbitration
Generally, a court will possess at least three distinct opportunities to
weigh in on the confidentiality of an arbitration proceeding. 203 First, one of
the parties to an arbitration agreement may seek to compel arbitration and
to stay or dismiss any pending lawsuit concerning an arguably arbitrable
dispute.204 Second, one or both of the parties may sue after an arbitration
either to confirm and enter judgment on an award or to modify or vacate
it.2 0 5 Finally, a party to a prior confidential arbitration may seek to block
discovery concerning the arbitral award or proceeding. 206 Although rela-
tively little judicial precedent exists, courts are beginning to address the
confidentiality of arbitration at these junctures.
1. Generally Applicable Contract Defenses: Unconscionability and
Public Policy
In determining whether to permit litigation to proceed or, instead, to
compel the parties to arbitrate, a court must determine whether an enforce-
able arbitration agreement exists. The Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA")
makes arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract. ' 207 The FAA "preclude[s] States from singling out arbitration
provisions for suspect status, requiring instead that such provisions be
203. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Arbitration and State Action, 2005 BYU L. REv. 1, 39 (2005) [here-
inafter Cole, State Action] (noting that "[c]ourt involvement occurs, if at all, prior to start of arbitration
and after the completion of arbitration"); Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12, at 1004-05
(describing judicial involvement in arbitration).
204. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 4 (West Supp. 2005) (concerning "Failure to arbitrate under agreement;
petition to United States court having jurisdiction for order to compel arbitration; notice and service
thereof; hearing and determination").
205. Id. § 9 ("Award of arbitrators; confirmation; jurisdiction; procedure"); id. § 10 ("Same; vaca-
tion; grounds; rehearing"); id. § 11 ("Same; modification or correction; grounds, order"). The parties
may also seek judicial assistance during an arbitration. See Id. § 5 (authorizing court to resolve disputes
concerning the appointment of an arbitrator or the filling of an arbitrator vacancy); id. § 7 (authorizing
parties to request judicial assistance to compel the attendance of witnesses or issue contempt). See
Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2004) (describing court's role even in cases
ordered to arbitration).
206. See infra Part III.A.3 and note 248 (examining discovery of arbitration-related information).
207. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2. The desire to eliminate the historic judicial hostility to arbitration agreements
largely motivated enactment of the FAA in 1928. "Section 2 of the FAA puts arbitration agreements on
the same footing as other types of contracts." Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc., 379 F.3d at 166.
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placed 'upon the same footing as other contracts."'' 208 Accordingly, while
courts and legislatures may not single out confidentiality clauses in arbitra-
tion agreements for special treatment, generally applicable contract de-
fenses may invalidate those provisions. 209 Courts have utilized the
doctrines of both unconscionability and public policy to invalidate arbitra-
tion confidentiality.
a. Unconscionability
The generally applicable defense of unconscionability "seeks to pre-
vent substantial unfairness between contracting parties having grossly un-
equal bargaining power. ''210 Substantive unconscionability reflects a
concem with one-sided or overly harsh agreements and will invalidate arbi-
tration provisions that are too heavily weighted in one party's favor.211
Several courts, including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the
Washington Supreme Court, have found confidentiality provisions in con-
sumer and employee arbitration agreements substantively unconscion-
able. 212  According to these courts, facially neutral confidentiality
provisions disproportionately favor repeat participants who have firsthand
knowledge of how prior arbitrations against them have fared. In contrast,
one-shot participants like employees and consumers, cannot access or util-
208. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
209. See id. (holding that "generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or uncon-
scionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening [the FAA]"). But
see infra note 220 (discussing risk that FAA may preempt arbitration-specific use of unconscionability
doctrine).
210. Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 279 (3d Cir. 2004). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (permitting court to refuse to enforce uncon-
scionable contract or contract term). See generally Randall, supra note 105, for a discussion of the
doctrine of unconscionability and its application to arbitration agreements.
211. See LaRocca, supra note 108, at 950-52 (discussing attacks on the enforceability of arbitration
agreements). Procedural unconscionability, in contrast, focuses on contract formation and will generally
exist if a contract is one of adhesion. See Parilla, 368 F.3d at 276. Although many jurisdictions require
both procedural and substantive unconscionability, courts generally discuss arbitration confidentiality in
terms of substantive unconscionability.
212. See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2003) (declaring confidentiality provi-
sion in contract between AT&T and potentially seven million California consumers unconscionable
under California law); Luna v. Household Fin. Corp., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1180-81 (W.D. Wash.
2002) (invalidating confidentiality provision in loan contract with borrowers who consolidated debt);
Acorn v. Household Int'l Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1171-72 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (finding confidentiality
clause of mortgage financing arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable); Torrance v. Aames
Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 875 (D. Or. 2002) (invalidating confidentiality provision in arbi-
tration agreement appended to mortgage contract); Zuver v. Airtouch Commc'ns, Inc., 103 P.3d 753,
764-65 (Wash. 2004) (en banc) (invalidating confidentiality clause in employment contract with em-
ployee alleging disability discrimination).
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ize such arbitral precedent. 213 Confidentiality of arbitral awards conceals
these advantages to repeat players and precludes the "scrutiny critical to
mitigating those advantages. '214 This informational asymmetry addition-
ally hampers the ability of one-shot participants and other potential claim-
ants to build a case of intentional or unlawful misconduct against a repeat
player. 215 Finally, the secrecy of arbitration can undermine "an employee's
confidence in the fairness and honesty of the arbitration process and thus,
potentially discourages that employee from pursuing a valid discrimination
claim."216 These courts thus view arbitration confidentiality as unfairly
one-sided and disproportionately favorable to repeat players like lenders,
employers, and service providers, who already possess superior bargaining
power. Unconscionability will invalidate the confidentiality provision it-
self, and, if combined with other unconscionable provisions, might nullify
the arbitration agreement in its entirety.2 17
Unconscionability challenges have not fared as well in all jurisdic-
tions, however. Both the Third and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals recently
refused to find confidentiality provisions in employment and consumer
213. In Ting, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "if the company succeeds in imposing a gag order,
plaintiffs are unable to mitigate the advantages inherent in being a repeat player." 319 F.3d at 1152. The
specific advantages enjoyed by repeat players include "unequal information in arbitrator selection,
unequal representation at the hearing, a repeat participant's ability to screen out and settle meritorious
cases, and the arbitrator's incentive to satisfy repeat customers." Acorn, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 1172 (inter-
nal quotations omitted). See also Torrance, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 875 (noting that confidentiality gave
mortgagor a "vastly superior legal posture"); Zuver, 103 P.3d at 765 (noting that while public interest in
open arbitration may not render confidentiality provision unconscionable, in employment contract, it
benefited only the employer).
214. Acorn, 211 F. Supp. 2dat 1172.
215. As noted by the Ninth Circuit, "the unavailability of arbitral decisions may prevent potential
plaintiffs from obtaining the information needed to build a case of intentional misconduct or unlawful
discrimination against AT&T." Ting, 319 F.3d at 1152. See also Zuver, 103 P.3d at 765 (holding that
clause "hampers an employee's ability to prove a pattern of discrimination or to take advantage of
findings in past arbitrations").
216. Zuver, 103 P.3d at 765.
217. Ordinarily, an arbitration agreement will contain a severability clause that would dictate only
severance of the specific invalid clause. A court will sever the unlawful clause unless doing so will
defeat a primary purpose or essential part of the agreement. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS
§ 603 (1932) (focusing on whether severance of illegal term will defeat the primary purpose of the
bargain); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 184 (1981) (directing severance of clause that
violates public policy unless it constitutes "an essential part of the agreed exchange"). Frequently,
however, a court that has invalidated a confidentiality clause in an arbitration agreement will also find
other provisions, such as class action waivers and fee-splitting provisions, similarly unconscionable. In
such cases, the court might find that each of the interrelated unlawful provisions "magnify the one-
sidedness of the others," thus tainting the entire agreement and rendering severance inappropriate.
Luna, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1183. Compare Torrance, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (holding that arbitration
agreement was "so permeated by unconscionability so as to render it invalid"), with Zuver, 103 P.3d at
769 (severing confidentiality and remedies provisions from arbitration agreement).
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arbitration agreements so one-sided as to render them unconscionable. 218
As explained by the Third Circuit,
Each side has the same rights and restraints under those provisions and
there is nothing inherent in confidentiality itself that favors or burdens
one party vis-a-vis the other in the dispute resolution process. Impor-
tantly, the confidentiality of the proceedings will not impede or burden in
any way [the employee's] ability to obtain any relief to which she may
be entitled.219
Thus, not all courts have embraced the unconscionability doctrine as a
method of policing arbitration secrecy. Moreover, if courts are applying the
unconscionability defense more frequently or more rigorously to arbitration
agreements than to other contracts, they risk violating the FAA's prohibi-
tion against singling out arbitration for special scrutiny.220 Finally, the un-
conscionability doctrine focuses solely on the power imbalance between
the contracting parties and the "harshness of a particular bargain." 221 Many
of the concerns with arbitration secrecy, however, go beyond the immedi-
ate parties and focus on potential plaintiffs and the public at large. 222 Un-
conscionability thus may be too narrow a tool to effectively regulate the
confidentiality of ADR.223
218. Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC, 369 F.3d 263 (enforcing confidentiality provisions in employee
arbitration agreement that incorporated AAA rules); Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., IV, Inc., 368 F.3d
269 (3d Cir. 2004) (refusing to invalidate confidentiality provision incorporated into employment
agreement, notwithstanding other unconscionable provisions in agreement); Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc.
v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting Ting and enforcing confidential-
ity provision of cellular telephone agreement).
219. Parilla, 368 F.3d at 280. See also Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc., 379 F.3d at 175 (acknowledging
that while the confidentiality provision "is probably more favorable to the cellular provider," it is not
"so offensive as to be invalid" given that confidentiality can benefit the customer in some circum-
stances).
220. See Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc., 379 F.3d at 167 (cautioning that states may not use doctrines of
general applicability "in ways that subject arbitration clauses to special scrutiny"); see also Kelly
Thompson Cochran & Eric J. Mogilnicki, Current Issues in Consumer Arbitration, 60 Bus. LAW. 785,
788 (2005) (arguing that "treating confidentiality clauses in arbitration agreements differently from
other contracts would appear to raise serious federal preemption concerns"); Michael G. McGuinness &
Adam J. Karr, California's "Unique" Approach to Arbitration: Why This Road Less Traveled Will
Make All the Difference on the Issue of Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 1 J. DISPUTE
RESOL. 61 (2005) (arguing that FAA should preempt use of unconscionability doctrine as backdoor bias
against arbitration); Randall, supra note 105, at 194 (contending that courts are circumventing the FAA
"through expansive, arbitration-specific uses of unconscionability" and suggesting restrained use of
doctrine to avoid preemption).
221. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc., 379 F.3d at 175 n.20.
222. See supra Part III.A (examining arbitration secrecy).
223. See Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc., 379 F.3d at 175 n.20 (recognizing that "[tbe vice (if any) of
the confidentiality clause lies mostly in its systematic effect, not in its oppressiveness as regards the
particular plaintiffs before us"); Parilla, 368 F.3d at 280 (noting that concern with confidentiality "was
not about any potential unfairness between two contracting parties vis-a-vis each other," but with
broader substantive policies). See also Garfield, supra note 2, at 285-86 (suggesting that unconscion-
ability may be inadequate to deal with "contracts of silence" because they are contrary to the public, but
[Vol 81:463
PUBLIC COURTS V. PRIVATE JUSTICE
b. Public Policy
A public policy defense might provide a broader, arguably more fit-
ting contract doctrine to address the systemic threat posed by arbitration
secrecy. Under this common law defense, a court can refuse to enforce all
or part of a contract on public policy grounds, if "the interest in its en-
forcement is clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy
against the enforcement of such terms. ' 224 Absent legislation expressly
prohibiting a confidentiality clause, a court must "derive" public policy
from other laws and "its own sense of public welfare. ' 225 The substantive
policies underlying consumer protection, employment discrimination, and
other statutory rights supply one such benchmark for public policy.
A recent decision from the Ohio Court of Appeals, Eagle v. Fred Mar-
tin Motor Co., 226 is illustrative. In that case, the purchaser of an automobile
sued a dealership for unfair and deceptive practices under Ohio consumer
law. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected the dealership's effort to compel
arbitration after finding several provisions of the arbitration agreement,
including a confidentiality clause, unenforceable as against public pol-
icy.227 In so holding, the court distinguished the defenses of unconscion-
ability and public policy. Unlike unconscionability, which focuses "on the
relationship between the parties and the effect of the agreement upon
them," public policy required "the court to consider the impact of such
arrangements upon society as a whole. ' 228 The court similarly contrasted
the openness of the courts with the privacy of arbitration, noting that while
"public access to court proceedings helps society become aware of unfair
business acts and practices, educating consumers and thereby discouraging
such activities," private arbitration proceedings "prevent the public from
discovering such violative acts and practices. '229 While recognizing that
judicial and arbitral proceedings may merit different treatment, the court
declared that "limitations on a consumer's right of redress and the public's
not necessarily oppressive to the parties); Stemlight & Jensen, supra note 17, at 103 (contending that
unconscionability defense is "too expensive and unwieldy" to regulate class-action arbitration waivers).
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178(1) (1981). A court can also refuse to enforce
any statutorily prohibited contract provision. See id. § 178 cmt. a. See also Garfield, supra note 2, at
294-343 (suggesting that courts use a case-by-case balancing approach to invalidate some contracts of
silence as against public policy).
225. Garfield, supra note 2, at 300.
226. 809 N.E.2d 1161 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
227. Id. at 1182-83. The Ohio court used public policy grounds to additionally invalidate an arbi-
tration provision that negated the consumer's right to proceed through a class action or as a private
attorney general. Id. at 1183.
228. Id. at 1180.
229. Id. at 1181.
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access to vital consumer information should not be allowed," even in
arbitration. 230
The arbitration clause in Eagle prohibited the consumer from sharing
information regarding the subject matter of the arbitration with anyone.
And, unless the consumer was willing to pay for a reasoned arbitration
award, the arbitrator could not disclose information about the specific acts
and practices found to violate the consumer protection laws.231 By imped-
ing public access to information concerning these deceptive acts and prac-
tices, then, the confidentiality clause frustrated government enforcement
and contravened the policies and purposes of the underlying consumer
laws. 232
As with unconscionability, however, courts may face difficulty using
the contract defense of public policy to regulate ADR secrecy. The confi-
dentiality of arbitration did not appear to bother the United States Supreme
Court when it held that private arbitration can effectively vindicate the
statutory rights of employees and consumers. 233 Courts will be unable to
use public policy to disguise a general attack on arbitration itself. More-
over, whether they are litigating or arbitrating, parties can confidentially
settle those statutory claims and similarly frustrate their underlying policy
goals. 234 Confidential settlements can deprive existing and potential claim-
ants of information necessary to build their case or prevent disclosure of
information relevant to public welfare, health, and safety.235 While confi-
dential settlements may themselves call for greater regulation, courts rarely
refuse to enforce those contracts as against public policy. 236
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1183 (declaring provision requiring consumer to pay for findings of fact and conclusions
of law "ultimately prohibitive, not only in terms of public access restrictions, but also in regards to
cost"). But see Hutcherson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 897 (I11. App. Ct. 2003) (holding
that because arbitration awards are not confidential, other potential plaintiffs "would not be operating
'in the dark').
232. Eagle, 809 N.E.2d at 1182-83. Although the Eagle court relied primarily upon public policy,
it further held that the "characteristics of secrecy and limitation of consumer rights... contribute[d] to
the substantive unconscionability of the arbitration clause." Id. at 1183.
233. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (upholding arbitration of
ADEA claim notwithstanding argument that lack of written opinion resulted in "lack of public knowl-
edge of employers' discriminatory policies"); Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269,
280 (3d Cir. 2004) (expecting that Supreme Court would not find confidentiality of Title VII arbitra-
tions unenforceable as against public policy). See also supra note 159 and accompanying text.
234. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 (indicating that concerns with privacy of arbitration "apply equally to
settlements of ADEA claims, which.., are clearly allowed"); Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular
Wireless, 379 F.3d 159, 176 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that state law did not prohibit repeat players from
using confidential settlements to prevent adverse findings).
235. See supra Part 1.G.
236. Although settling parties possess relative freedom to privately contract for confidentiality, a
court can still refuse to issue a protective or sealing order on public policy grounds. See Dor6, Settle-
ment, supra note 2, at 798-800 (discussing settling parties' "wide latitude to craft provisions that will
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2. Motions to Confirm or Vacate
Voluntary compliance with an arbitral award may obviate the need for
judicial review or involvement. 237 Under the FAA and state laws patterned
upon it, however, a prevailing party to an arbitration can petition a court to
confirm the award and enter judgment thereon. 238 Alternatively, a dissatis-
fied participant can request that a court vacate or modify an arbitral award
under narrow grounds for judicial review.239 By involving the court in the
proceeding, the parties to an otherwise confidential arbitration risk sacrific-
ing the secrecy of the arbitral forum for the presumptive openness of the
courtroom. Once arbitration documents are filed with the court with a re-
quest for judicial action, they become judicial records subject to the right of
public access. As with other judicial records, the court must assess whether
the need for privacy outweighs any applicable public interest in disclosure.
And neither the arbitrator's order nor the parties' confidentiality agreement
will necessarily bind the court.240
cloak their settlements with seemingly impenetrable layers of confidentiality"). In some cases, a court
might further refuse to enforce the private agreement itself as against public policy. See Cariveau v.
Halferty, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 417, 418 (Ct. App. 2000) (voiding as against public policy a confidential
settlement that prohibited customer from disclosing broker's misconduct to broker's employer or regu-
latory authorities). See generally Garfield, supra note 2, for an argument that courts should invalidate
some contracts of silence as against public policy. Finally, some sunshine in litigation statutes invali-
date confidentiality agreements that conceal public hazards. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West
2004) (rendering unenforceable any agreement or contract that has the "purpose or effect of concealing
a public hazard"); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1426 (2005) (voiding contractual provisions that have
"purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard"); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.611 (2005) (permitting
court to void confidential settlement agreements that limit disclosure in product liability/hazardous
substance claims).
237. See JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 181 (2001) (stating
that "[v]oluntary compliance with arbitral awards is usually high"). Even if a losing party complies with
an award, however, the successful party may still petition a court to enter judgment on the award. See
infra note 245.
238. FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2000) (permitting any party to the arbitration to apply to a court for an
order confirming arbitration award); UNF. ARBITRATION ACT § 11 (1956) (confirmation of award);
REV. UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 22 (2000) (confirmation of award). See also supra note 154 (discuss-
ing limited judicial review of arbitration awards).
239. FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (vacation of award); id. § II (modification or correction of award); UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT § 12 (vacation of award), id. § 13 (modification or correction of award); REV. UNiF.
ARBITRATION ACT § 23 (vacation of award), id. § 24 (modification or correction of award).
240. As one judge admonished,
I write this brief memorandum to put counsel for these parties on notice, as well as other par-
ties that seek similar relief, that I will not necessarily agree in advance to the sealing of an ar-
bitration award to facilitate a settlement. Court records are presumptively open for public
inspection and parties should not assume that their agreement to secrecy in the arbitration
proceeding would automatically carry over to a sealing of an arbitration award where the as-
sistance of the court is sought to enforce the award. Courts have obligations to the public that
private arbitrators do not.
In re [Sealed], 64 F. Supp. 2d 183, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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Courts have recognized their independent duty to examine the confi-
dentiality of arbitration when the parties seek their assistance to confirm or
vacate arbitration awards. In Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Rite Aid
Corp.,241 for example, an employment dispute and a resulting coverage
controversy arising out of a high-profile financial scandal concerning Rite
Aid Corporation were submitted to confidential arbitration. Rite Aid's li-
ability insurer sued to vacate the confidential arbitration award that re-
quired it to indemnify Rite Aid for a separate multimillion dollar arbitral
award won by a former Rite Aid employee. Both the docket and record in
the court proceedings were sealed by stipulation of the parties, who were
negotiating a settlement of the underlying arbitration awards. In analyzing
"whether it [was] appropriate for [the] case to remain shrouded under
seal," 242 the district court sua sponte engaged in the balancing of interests
applicable to the sealing of judicial records and proceedings.
According to the Rite Aid court, neither the confidentiality of the arbi-
tral forum nor the federal policy of encouraging arbitration, "trump[ed] the
clear law and policy standards ... for maintaining open and accessible
records of legal matters for public scrutiny. '243 Instead, the significant
public interest in the case required that the record be unsealed:
[I]n light of the recent, well-publicized corporate scandals and fraud per-
petrated on both the public and financial community, and pursuant to the
common law public policy of open disclosure standards... for legal
proceedings, allowing transparency into the unprecedented Rite Aid cor-
porate scandal weighs heavily in favor of unsealing the record.
244
Similar reasoning can apply to more common arbitrations involving
claims of discrimination or that implicate other public interests in disclo-
sure.24 5 The filing of the arbitration award with the court triggers the scru-
tiny traditionally accorded judicial proceedings in litigation. Accordingly,
confidentiality agreements in arbitration will not warrant sealing the entire
judicial record of a proceeding to vacate or confirm an arbitral award and,
241. 345 F. Supp. 2d 497 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
242. Id. at 499.
243. Id. at 507 n.3.
244. Id. at 505 (citation omitted).
245. In Malek v. 24 Hour Fitness, No. N03-1473 (Super. Ct. Cal., Contra Costa County, June 4,
2004) (unpublished), for example, an arbitrator awarded a victim of sexual harassment and retaliation
substantial compensatory and punitive damages against her health club employer. Unlike Rite Aid, the
underlying arbitration in Malek was not covered by a confidentiality agreement or rule. Although the
health club sought to prevent disclosure by satisfying the award, the successful plaintiff sued to reduce
it to judgment. Both the arbitrator and the court refused the health club's requests for confidentiality. Id.
See also Malek v. 24 Hour Fitness, Arb. No. 199017 (Apr. 23, 2003) (Chvany, Arb.) (finding that
privacy of arbitration did not "mean that there are legal grounds to seal the record in its entirety thereby
preventing a party from disseminating information concerning the proceeding").
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absent compelling circumstances, should not justify sealing the court
docket or the court's own decisions or orders.
246
3. Discovery of Confidential Arbitrations
As discussed, confidentiality clauses in arbitration agreements can im-
pede potential plaintiffs from obtaining information necessary to build their
cases and may even restrict regulatory agencies from investigating and
enforcing statutory rights.247 Courts may thus confront ADR confidentiality
when these potential litigants seek to discover arbitral decisions and awards
or information produced during an arbitration proceeding. 248 In these cases,
important public and private values again collide.
On one hand, protecting the confidentiality of arbitration furthers the
strong public policy favoring ADR by protecting party expectations and
"ensuring that parties in an arbitration proceeding get the protections for
which they contracted. ' 249 At the same time, however, courts must simi-
larly protect the "countervailing public and private interest in affording a
litigant the opportunity to broadly discover information in support of its
case."'250 As recently recognized by one court, "'[a]n overzealous quest for
ADR can distort the proper role of the court' by suppressing admissible
evidence in the name of confidentiality." 251
The discovery of confidential arbitrations thus implicates issues very
similar to those raised when collateral litigants seek information covered by
a stipulated protective order or a confidential settlement agreement. In liti-
gation, the sharing of information with similarly situated litigants prevents
wasteful duplication of effort, furthers the truth-seeking function of discov-
246. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Lines, 239 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 378 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2004) (refusing to seal court's decisions and orders
or to excise text of arbitration award, notwithstanding sealing order of arbitral panel). Cf DiRussa v.
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 121 F.3d 818 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that court did not abuse discretion in
sealing file of arbitration proceeding when court's opinion discussing the underlying facts and discrimi-
nation findings permitted public scrutiny of the defendant's discriminatory acts).
247. See supra Part III.A. I (discussing unconscionability and public policy).
248. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Cunningham Lindsey Claims Mgmt., Inc., Nos.
03CV0531, 03CV1625 (DLI)(MLO), 2005 WL 1522783 (E.DN.Y. June 28, 2005) (considering dis-
covery of arbitration award); Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Int'l, Inc., No. Civ. A. 04-
N-1228, 2004 WL 1821968, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 13, 2004) (discussing how "confidentiality agreement
between parties to an arbitration might circumscribe discovery in a collateral lawsuit"); Contship Con-
tainerlines, Ltd. v. PPG Indus., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 0194, 2003 WL 1948807 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2003)
(permitting discovery of materials produced in arbitration of boat accident).
249. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 2005 WL 1522783, at *3. See also Lawrence E. Jaffee Pension
Plan, 2004 WL 1821968, at *2 (stating that "a court should not cavalierly disregard the expectations of
the parties to an arbitration as memorialized in their confidentiality agreement").




ery, and it provides compelling reason to modify a court's confidentiality
order. Although parties possess wide latitude to privately contract for con-
fidentiality vis-A-vis each other, their confidentiality agreement, whether in
litigation or in arbitration, should not bind the court or third parties.
252
As with private settlements, then, the confidentiality of arbitration
should not conceal evidence or unduly impair the discovery rights of third
parties. Employers should not be permitted to use the confidentiality of an
arbitration to silence employees or to conceal otherwise discoverable in-
formation if the facts of one employment dispute are relevant to another.
253
Nor should ADR confidentiality preclude victims of discrimination or other
misconduct from sharing information with regulatory agencies charged
with "righting the wrongs inflicted upon them. '254 "Adjudicative facts" that
relate to the underlying merits of a controversy and that exist independent
of a settlement are not immune from discovery simply because they are
subject to a confidentiality agreement or produced in the course of com-
promise discussions. 255 The same should hold true for otherwise discover-
able information produced in connection with an arbitration.
252. See Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan, 2004 WL 1821968, at *2-*3 (relying on court's author-
ity to modify protective orders to permit disclosure of documents produced in arbitration); Contship
Containerlines, Ltd., 2003 WL 1948807, at *2 (holding that any implied obligation of confidentiality
arising from foreign arbitration did not preclude district court from requiring disclosure of relevant
requested materials).
253. See Wendt v. Walden Univ., Inc., No. Civ. 4-95-467, 1996 WL 84668 (D. Minn. Jan. 16,
1996) (permitting co-workers to depose employee who had confidentially settled with employer);
Kalinauskas v. Wong, 151 F.R.D. 363, 367 (D. Nev. 1993) (permitting plaintiff in a sex discrimination
suit to depose former employee who had confidentially settled with employer and to seek information
concerning employment with defendant, knowledge of sexual harassment, and other "factual informa-
tion" surrounding settled case); Llemena v. J.B. Hanauer & Co., 845 A.2d 732, 739 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2002)
(balancing parties' interest in confidential settlement against public's interest in eradicating workplace
discrimination to permit discovery of sexual harassment of other women); Farmers Group, Inc. v. Lee,
28 P.3d 413 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (refusing to enjoin employee party to confidential settlement from
testifying in another employee's suit against employer). See generally Moberly, supra note 197, at 41-
49 (examining discovery and confidentiality agreements in wrongful discharge litigation).
254. EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 745 (1st Cir. 1996) (enjoining employer from enforc-
ing confidentiality provisions that prevented former settling employees from filing charges with the
EEOC or assisting others to do so). See also In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Kronenberg, 117
P.3d 1134 (Wash. 2005) (disbarring attorney for facilitating settlement that prevented rape victim from
testifying against his client); Cariveau v. Halferty, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 417, 418 (Ct. App. 2000) (voiding
as against public policy confidential settlement that prohibited customer from disclosing broker's
misconduct to broker's employer or regulatory authorities).
255. Federal Rule of Evidence 408 "does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise
discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations." FED. R. EVID.
408. That is, parties cannot use the settlement process as a "screen for curtailing [an] adversary's right
of discovery." In re Subpoena Issued to Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n., 370 F. Supp. 2d 201,
211 (D.D.C. 2005). See generally Dor&, Settlement, supra note 2, at 813-16 (distinguishing between
settlement facts and adjudicative facts concerning the discovery of private settlements).
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B. Mediation
Of course, information that is subject to an evidentiary privilege, such
as a mediation or settlement privilege, is not otherwise discoverable. 256 As
previously discussed, an overly broad, absolute mediation or settlement
privilege that is not subject to exception for good cause can likewise con-
ceal relevant information and impede the discovery rights of third parties.
To curb this danger, courts can narrowly construe the privilege and refuse
to extend it beyond the formal ADR proceedings for which it was de-
signed.257 Similarly, courts can carefully scrutinize whether material was
actually and solely prepared "for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursu-
ant to, a mediation. ' '258 This scrutiny is particularly important in court-
connected mediation where materials may have been gathered for purposes
of already-pending litigation. Courts must ensure that facts, documents, and
communications that would have existed notwithstanding the ADR process
are not improperly concealed.
In some cases like Rojas, however, justice may even require disclo-
sure of documents prepared in anticipation or for purposes of mediation.
Under an absolute privilege, a court cannot balance the need for confidenti-
ality against the need for disclosure or weigh the competing harms. A
qualified privilege that permits at least some balancing of interests would
provide a necessary safety valve and permit discovery of mediation-related
information when justified by sufficiently compelling cause.259
As with work product, the threshold for disclosure of mediation-
related information may be high. Undoubtedly, much of what occurs in
preparation for or during the course of a mediation or settlement conference
deserves to be confidential. 260 Settlement, the ultimate objective of this
type of ADR, serves important public policies by promoting "a more effi-
cient, more cost-effective, and significantly less burdened judicial sys-
256. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (restricting scope of discovery to "any matter, not privileged");
see also supra Part II.B.2 (examining mediation privilege).
257. See supra note 196.
258. Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 270-71 (Cal. 2004) (remanding to determine whether
photos, videotapes, and raw test data were prepared by landlord in preparation for mediation or for
litigation).
259. The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act applicable to ADR proceedings involving admin-
istrative agencies, for example, authorizes disclosure of dispute resolution communications when
necessary to prevent "manifest injustice." 5 U.S.C. § 574(a)(4)(A) (2000). See also In re Anonymous,
283 F.3d 627, 637 (4th Cir. 2002) (prohibiting disclosure of communications made during appellate
mediation program "unless the party seeking such disclosure can demonstrate that 'manifest injustice'
will result from non-disclosure").
260. See generally Dor6, Settlement, supra note 2, at 823-26 (discussing the confidentiality of
court-sponsored settlement negotiations); Dor&, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 2, at 392-94 (discuss-
ing the sealing of court-annexed ADR).
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tem. '261 Although one can question the necessity of an evidentiary privi-
lege, the success of mediation or any negotiation process does depend upon
a closed and confidential bargaining forum. Moreover, settlement discus-
sions can be punctuated by puffing and posturing, and they can be moti-
vated as much by a desire for peace as by a concession of the merits.
262
Given their questionable relevance and accuracy and their potential to mis-
lead, mediation-related communications may merit confidentiality. 263 That
privacy, however, should not be used to shelter evidence relevant to other
litigation or to public health, welfare, or safety.264 In appropriate cases, in
other words, the privilege should be permitted to yield.
265
IV. A UNIFIED APPROACH
Litigants forfeit a large measure of privacy when they employ the
court system to resolve their dispute. At the same time, alternatives to liti-
gation such as arbitration and mediation enable and encourage parties to
keep their dispute confidential. 266 These divergent approaches, however,
rest upon an artificial dichotomy and questionable assumptions concerning
party autonomy and the policy favoring settlement. A unified view that
regards litigation and ADR as points on a continuum of dispute resolution
processes calls instead for a similarly unified approach to confidentiality
and correspondingly greater scrutiny of ADR secrecy.
261. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir. 2003).
See also Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension & Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1177 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (noting that mediation privilege fosters "conciliatory relationships among parties to a dispute,"
reduces "litigation costs," and decreases "the size of state and federal court dockets, thereby increasing
the quality of justice in those cases that do not settle voluntarily").
262. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 332 F.3d at 981 (commenting on "inherent questionability
of the truthfulness of any statements made [in settlement negotiations]"); Cook v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
Inc., 132 F.R.D. 548, 554 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (denying discovery of settlement negotiations).
263. In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Sixth Circuit discounted any evidentiary loss caused by a
settlement privilege given the "inherent questionability of the truthfulness" of settlement communica-
tions and their lack of relevance. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 332 F.3d at 981, 983. See also Cook,
132 F.R.D. at 554 (suggesting that discovery of settlement communications would be "highly mislead-
ing if allowed... for purposes other than settlement").
264. See Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 16, at 658-59 (recognizing that ADR confi-
dentiality permits parties to shelter documents from subsequent disclosure in litigation).
265. See In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 637 (4th Cir. 2002) (balancing "the public interest in
protecting the confidentiality of the settlement process and countervailing interests, such as the right to
every person's evidence").
266. See Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 169, at 24-25 (questioning intuitive assumption that permits
ADR parties to keep disputes secret).
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A. The Multidoor Courthouse
The current dichotomy between confidentiality in litigation and confi-
dentiality in ADR reflects a bipolar civil justice system that separates in-
court dispute resolution from alternatives to litigation.267 Litigation and
ADR, however, are not wholly separate and independent processes. As
noted by Professor Reuben and others, the embrace of ADR has created a
"multidoor courthouse" that provides "a unified system of public civil jus-
tice in which trial, arbitration, mediation, evaluative techniques, and other
forms of ADR all operate toward the single end of binding public civil
dispute resolution. ' 268 Judges increasingly sponsor, encourage, and even
mandate ADR procedures in cases that are initially commenced in litiga-
tion. 269 Likewise, many disputes begun in arbitration eventually wind up
before a court in litigation. 270 This "real intertwining and intermingling of
dispute resolution techniques"'271 undermines the distinction between litiga-
tion and ADR and the contradictory attitudes toward confidentiality.
B. Party Autonomy
ADR is built on the premise that parties design, manage, and control
the resolution of their disputes. 272 This deference to party autonomy and
self-determination increases ADR's attraction, while validating its out-
267. See supra note 105.
268. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12, at 956 (contending that "trial is but one end of
a spectrum of public civil dispute resolution, rather than the exclusive method"). See also Cole, State
Action, supra note 203, at 48-51 (maintaining that dispute resolution is not an exclusive state function);
Stemlight, Separate and Not Equal, supra note 16, at 716 (criticizing artificial walls that divide various
dispute resolution procedures).
269. See Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 16, at 597 (observing that arbitration and
mediation are no longer "extrajudicial" because they have been brought inside courthouse); Sternlight,
Separate and Not Equal, supra note 16, at 694-95 (noting that courts frequently require that cases
proceed through ADR as prerequisite to later litigation). See also supra notes 165-66 and accompany-
ing text.
270. See Moohr, supra note 17, at 448 (commenting that litigation "is not entirely public, and
arbitration ... is not entirely private"); Stemlight, Separate and Not Equal, supra note 16, at 690 (not-
ing that "disputes commenced in court increasingly are directed to ADR" and that cases commenced in
ADR are often litigated).
271. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal, supra note 16, at 697 (reflecting that ADR occurs in the
shadow of litigation, while litigation occurs in the shadow of ADR).
272. See Alfini & McCabe, supra note 109, at 173 (listing party self-determination and voluntari-
ness among core principles of mediation); Cole, Managerial Litigants, supra note 109 at 1200-01
(discussing party autonomy model on which ADR is built and fact that party consent provides "nearly
exclusive guiding principle for [ADR's] process design"); Moohr, supra note 17, at 443 (noting that
ADR forums commonly assume "that individual litigants should control and manage their suits");
Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 16, at 624 (observing that public benefits of ADR flow from
"the reduction of conflict.., predicated on parties' preferences").
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comes.273 Party autonomy likewise predicates ADR confidentiality, which
allows participants to arbitrate, mediate, negotiate, and settle their dispute
privately and confidentially, if they so desire.274 This "contractualist, lais-
sez-faire approach, '275 however, does not justify across-the-board accep-
tance of confidentiality concerning all ADR processes. Instead, while self-
determination may support the privacy of consensual, non-binding ADR
like mediation, it does not necessarily sustain the blanket secrecy of pre-
dispute binding arbitration.
In mediation, parties submit their dispute to a neutral mediator after
the controversy develops and the parties have knowledge of their respective
claims and defenses. The parties self-determine even court-mandated me-
diation by resolving their dispute on mutually agreed terms or returning to
litigation.
In contrast, in arbitration, a consumer or employee "agrees" to arbi-
trate before the controversy even arises. Consumer and employment arbi-
trations involve lopsided contracts between parties of profoundly unequal
bargaining strength. 276 Consent, such as it is, is likely to be woefully unin-
formed.277 The assumption that ADR participants choose or self-determine
confidentiality, then, does not necessarily hold true for many arbitrations
today.
273. See Cole, Managerial Litigants, supra note 109, at 1200-01 (suggesting that ability to control
process is what makes ADR attractive); Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 16, at 597, 624
(stating the presumption that "parties' agreements validate [ADR] outcomes").
274. See generally Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 2, at 297-300 (exploring party autonomy
and settlement).
275. Bales, supra note 109, at 604 (criticizing contractualist approach to arbitration of statutory
claims between parties of disparate bargaining power).
276. See Alfini & McCabe, supra note 109, at 192 (characterizing arbitration parties as "unwilling
participants in a seemingly voluntary process"); Bales, supra note 109, at 604 (challenging contractual-
ist approach to arbitration between "parties of grossly disparate bargaining power"); Demaine &
Hensler, supra note 110, at 74 (suggesting that even informed consumers are "in a poor position to
negotiate terms or seek services ... from other businesses"); Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note
16, at 662 (criticizing lack of judicial oversight of "vivid" and "profound" bargaining inequality).
277. Professors Demaine and Hensler challenge the assumption that consumer arbitrations involve
voluntary and informed consent. Their empirical study
provides little basis for believing that consumers are making informed decisions when they
"agree" to arbitrate in predispute arbitration clauses. More than a third of the clauses obtained
fail to inform consumers that they are waiving their right to litigate disputes in court. A fifth
of the clauses do not explicitly state that the outcome of arbitration is final and binding. More
than a third do not provide consumers with any information regarding the expenses they
should expect to incur in an arbitration proceeding. Many clauses are silent on key aspects of
arbitration... [a]nd almost a third of the clauses fail to state what organization will provide
the arbitration. Moreover, to be fully informed of the features of the arbitration to which they
are "agreeing," consumers would need to review the applicable provider rules, a daunting task
(made impossible when the arbitration provider is not named in the clause).
Demaine & Hensler, supra note 110, at 73.
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C. The Public Policy Favoring Settlement
As forms of alternative dispute resolution, confidential settlements,
arbitration, and mediation draw support from the strong public policy fa-
voring the "negotiated, non-judicial resolution of disputes. '278 As previ-
ously discussed, parties generally possess the power to privately settle their
disputes without judicial involvement or regulation.2 79 ADR confidentiality
is thus frequently justified by analogy to confidential settlements. Again,
however, a distinction should be drawn between arbitration and non-
binding mediation.
1. Arbitration
The Supreme Court itself has justified arbitration privacy by compari-
son to confidential settlements.2 80 If parties can conceal their dispute
through a confidential settlement, it is argued, they should similarly be
permitted to accomplish the same thing through private arbitration.
281
As noted above, however, the consensus in settlement occurs after the
dispute has arisen, while the agreement in arbitration (to the extent that it
exists), predates the parties' dispute. Additionally, although the settlement
itself may be confidential, any judicial records, proceedings, and court
decisions that preceded and perhaps motivated the compromise, remain
public unless good cause is shown. 282 In contrast, arbitration leaves no
public record of the dispute or its resolution.2 83
278. Randall, supra note 105, at 220 (indicating that neither arbitration nor settlement depend upon
judicial involvement). See also Mohr, supra note 17, at 440 (recognizing agreement to arbitrate as form
of voluntary dispute resolution).
279. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text. As discussed, some commentators have
called for greater regulation of even private "contracts of silence" that suppress evidence or conceal
information relevant to public health and safety. See, e.g., Garfield, supra note 2, at 294-318 (contend-
ing that courts should balance interest in confidentiality against public interests in disclosure and refuse
to enforce parties' agreements that sell silence); Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 16, at 648-
49 (suggesting that the judicial promotion of settlement may require regulation of "substantive provi-
sions of settlements made under courts' wings").
280. In Gilmer, the U.S. Supreme Court brushed aside objections to private arbitration of employ-
ment discrimination claims because such claims can also be resolved through confidential settlement or
informal conciliation. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-32 (1991).
281. In Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, 379 F.3d 159, 176 (5th Cir. 2004), for
example, the Fifth Circuit rejected an unconscionability challenge by analogizing arbitration confidenti-
ality to confidential settlement. The Iberia court found it "instructive" that "while confidential settle-
ments are not completely analogous to confidential arbitration," Louisiana permitted corporate repeat
players to "use confidential settlements to prevent a court from making adverse findings." Id. (italics in
original).
282. See supra notes 95-104 and accompanying text (discussing the good cause necessary to
support a confidentiality order).
283. See O'Keefe, supra note 137, at 856 (noting that settlement does not erase pleadings, judicial
proceedings, trial record, or decisions from the public record).
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Finally and most importantly, unlike a settlement, the agreement to
arbitrate does not resolve a dispute through mutually agreed terms. Al-
though the parties arguably consent to arbitrate their dispute, the arbitration
itself is an adversarial proceeding in which a non-judicial, third-party neu-
tral determines the outcome and imposes a decision upon the parties.
284
Unlike a settlement conference or mediation, arbitration does not depend
upon full and frank discussion or conciliatory offers. Posturing and puffery
do not necessarily mar the accuracy of arbitration evidence. Unlike state-
ments made to provoke settlement, information presented in arbitration is
presumably very relevant to the merits-because that is what the arbitrator
is deciding.285 Although less formal than litigation, then, arbitration resem-
bles litigation in that it constitutes an adjudicatory proceeding that substi-
tutes for and "orbit[s] fairly close to trial."
286
The "presumptive right to 'public observation' is at its apogee" with
respect to matters that affect the adjudication of a dispute287 and that
"serve[] as a substitute for trial. '288 The increasing number of civil disputes
diverted into arbitration, however, is siphoning the adjudicative function
out of the courts and into the hands of private arbitrators. Admittedly, the
arbitrator is not a judge, and arbitration does not likely implicate any "state
action. '289 The arbitrator, however, does perform a quasi-public function
when she adjudicates statutory claims grounded on public policy or re-
solves controversies having third-party effects. 290 Yet, the arbitrator's ad-
284. See Moohr, supra note 17, at 440 (describing arbitration as "fundamentally different" than
settlement, which provides an "alternative to third-party judgment" and which resolves dispute on
agreed terms); O'Keefe, supra note 137, at 856 (finding analogy between arbitration and settlement
"unsatisfactory, because arbitration results in a third-party decision after an adversarial process").
285. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (discussing the need for confidentiality con-
cerning mediation and settlement negotiations).
286. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12, at 1048-49 (contending that arbitration substi-
tutes for trial as a method of resolving disputes through "clash between adversaries"). See also Rabino-
vich-Einy, supra note 169, at 19 (describing arbitration as "the form of ADR closest to litigation");
Randall, supra note 105, at 209 (describing arbitration as "simply an alternative method for resolving
disputes and vindicating rights); Reuben, Democracy, supra note 151, at 296 (describing arbitration as
an adjudicatory proceeding in which a third-party neutral decides the dispute).
287. Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 140 (2d Cir. 2004).
288. Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Rush-
ford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 252 (4th Cir. 1988).
289. See Cole, State Action, supra note 203, at 3-4 (stating that courts uniformly find no "state
action" in contractual arbitration even though courts enforce the arbitration agreement and arbitration
awards). But see Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12, at 955 (arguing that "[a] strong, but
more controversial, argument can ... be made that contractual arbitration is... driven by state action").
290. See Bales, supra note 109, at 604 (rejecting laissez-faire attitude toward arbitration of statu-
tory claims grounded in public policy); Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 16, at 599 (suggest-
ing that ordinary rules of contract do not necessarily apply to "court-based contracts" that have third-
party effects); Thornburg, supra note 17, at 277 (contending that "[a]rbitrators perform public func-
tions" in consumer cases).
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judication of the merits remains secret and the public is denied access to
information that would most likely be public if litigated.291
2. Mediation
The analogy to confidential settlements more aptly applies to media-
tion and other non-binding ADR procedures whose ultimate aim is settle-
ment. Successful negotiation and mediation may well depend upon the
confidentiality of those processes, and information disclosed may be of
questionable accuracy and relevance. 292 Even then, however, the extensive
involvement of the courts in mediation and court-annexed ADR arguably
distinguish those processes from purely private settlements.
As discussed, the presumption of public access to judicial proceedings
rests in large part on the need to monitor judges and hold them publicly
accountable. 293 Arguably, that rationale requires such supervision and regu-
lation when ADR is brought into the courthouse and judges increasingly
resolve disputes through negotiation rather than adjudication.294 After all, if
the public has a right to observe their judges "in action," shouldn't that
right include the judicial promotion of settlement-a significant portion of
judicial duties today?
Strong policies support the confidentiality of settlement negotiations
and proceedings, however.295 Like discovery, settlement proceedings are
historically closed procedures to which no tradition of accessibility at-
291. In this respect, access to an arbitral award differs from disclosure of the terms and amount of a
confidential settlement. The public arguably possess no presumptive right to discover the terms and
amount of a settlement between private parties. The settlement amount and its terms are the product of
compromise, not adjudication, and are motivated by considerations other than the merits. See Gambale,
377 F.3d at 143-44 (holding that need for confidentiality of settlement agreement and award overcomes
any presumption of access). See also Dor6, Secrecy by Consent, supra note 2, at 397-99 (distinguishing
between "settlement facts" and "adjudicative facts" in confidential settlements). In contrast, the arbitral
award represents the arbitrator's decision on the merits concerning liability and damages. But see
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Cunningham Lindsey Claims Mgmt., Inc., Nos. 03CV0531, 03CV1625
(DLI)(MLO), 2005 WL 1522783, at *1, *5 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2005) (refusing to compel production of
amount of arbitration award).
292. See O'Keefe, supra note 137, at 856 n.159 (analogizing mediation to pretrial settlement);
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 12, at 1049 (suggesting that less constitutional scrutiny is
due mediation than arbitration); Sherman, A Process Model, supra note 14, at 1578 (comparing media-
tion to negotiation and other facilitative processes that may depend on confidentiality).
293. See supra Part L.A (discussing right of access to judicial proceedings).
294. See Alfini & McCabe, supra note 109, at 172-73 (discussing the "official character of media-
tion in the shadow of the courts"); Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 16, at 597, 614 (noting
how court-connected negotiation and ADR are changing conception of "judicial"); Sternlight, Separate
and Not Equal, supra note 16, at 694-95 (stating that "court-connected ADR has now come to domi-
nate the work of some courts"). See also Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2002) (suggest-
ing that the "fact and consequences" of judicial participation in settlement "are public acts" in which
public has interest).
295. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing confidentiality of mediation and court-connected ADR).
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taches. 296 Moreover, court-annexed ADR does not adjudicate the litigants'
substantive rights and accordingly does not implicate any core judicial
function.297 As such, the presumption of public access, if any, is "markedly
weak" concerning court-sponsored ADR. 298 Good cause may justify clos-
ing these ADR proceedings if confidentiality facilitates participation in the
process and ultimate settlement of the dispute. Again, however, the confi-
dentiality of even these non-binding ADR activities should not be absolute
or operate to suppress otherwise discoverable evidence.
299
CONCLUSION
In sum, the divide between litigation and ADR may not be as gaping
as many assume. The exponential growth of court-sponsored ADR and the
increased diversion of controversies into arbitration blur that distinction
and suggest that ADR confidentiality can no longer be justified simply
because it involves alternatives to litigation. Arbitration arguably lies closer
to litigation than to settlement and thus may require greater transparency
and accessibility.
An increasing number of disputes that would otherwise be litigated in
open court are now being adjudicated in a closed and secret arbitral forum.
Many of these controversies involve employment, securities, and consumer
claims that additionally seek to vindicate statutory rights and public poli-
cies.300 The resolution of these disputes radiates beyond the immediate
parties and is of interest to others, including similarly situated plaintiffs,
potential victims, regulatory agencies, and the media. Yet, the confidential-
296. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980-81 (6th
Cit. 2003) (noting that "confidential settlement communications are a tradition in this country"); In re
Cincinnati Enquirer, 94 F.3d 198, 199 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that settlement proceedings like sum-
mary jury trials are "historically closed procedures"). See also supra Part I.C (examining right of access
to unfiled discovery).
297. See In re Cincinnati Enquirer, 94 F.3d at 199 (holding that summary jury trial "does not
present any matter for adjudication by the court"); B.H. v. McDonald, 49 F.3d 294, 300 (7th Cir. 1995)
(ruling that court does not adjudicate anyone's rights in settlement conference).
298. Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG, 377 F.3d 133, 143-44 & n.3 (2d Cir. 2004) (distinguishing
between adjudicative and settlement functions and finding that need for confidentiality of settlement
overcame "markedly weak," possibly non-existent, presumption of access). See generally Dor6, Secrecy
by Consent, supra note 2, for an examination of the presumption of public access concerning settlement
and settlement-related activities.
299. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (discussing judicial reluctance to enforce or
endorse confidential settlements that conceal evidence or gag witnesses), and supra notes 292-99 and
accompanying text (examining regulation of mediation confidentiality).
300. See Bales, supra note 109, at 606-07 (discussing tremendous growth in arbitration of em-
ployment claims); Demaine & Hensler, supra note 110, at 73-74 (studying frequency with which
consumer arbitration clauses are used in some industries); LaRocca, supra note 108, at 933-34 (noting
the increasing percentage of the U.S. workforce covered by pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agree-
ments).
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ity of arbitration prevents the public from learning of even the existence, let
alone the resolution, of these claims. Confidentiality of arbitrations like-
wise hampers the underlying policy goals of the laws at issue and may
prevent disclosure of information relevant to public safety or of other pub-
lic interest.
Greater transparency would alleviate at least some of these problems
associated with confidential arbitration. At the very least, in cases of obvi-
ous public interest, public disclosure of the existence of the dispute and the
identities of the parties would identify repeat players and alert the public to
possible continuing threats to public health and safety. Publication of the
arbitration awards in these cases, as well as the written findings and reason-
ing of the arbitrator, would perform educative and normative functions
similar to those performed by disclosure of judicial opinions and deci-
sions. 301
At the same time, arbitration does differ from litigation and may not
merit the same level of accessibility and openness. The arbitrator is not a
public official, and the parties, not taxpayers, finance the process. Unlike
judicial proceedings, arbitration is not governed by procedural or eviden-
tiary rules that help ensure the relevance or unprivileged status of informa-
tion presented. Opening informal arbitration proceedings to public scrutiny
might jeopardize the benefits in speed and expense that arbitration purport-
edly offers. 302 Thus, like unfiled discovery in litigation, good cause likely
supports the continued confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings them-
selves.
Several courts have attempted to regulate arbitration secrecy by refus-
ing to enforce confidentiality provisions in arbitration agreements or in
301. California, for example, requires private arbitration companies to make available to the gen-
eral public basic information regarding consumer arbitration cases that they administer, including the
names of the non-consumer parties, the disposition of the consumer claims, and the amount of the
awards. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/displaycode?section=ccp&group=01001-02000&file 1281-1281.96. See also CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1285, available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-bin/displaycode?section=ccp&group--01001-
02000&file=1285-1287.6 (requiring that petition to confirm or vacate arbitration awards name all
parties to the arbitration and attach arbitration award).
302. This concern motivated the Fifth Circuit in Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. to uphold the confiden-
tiality provision in a cellular telephone arbitration agreement:
If every arbitration were required to produce a publicly available, "precedential" decision on
par with a judicial decision, one would expect that parties contemplating arbitration would
demand discovery similar to that permitted under Rule 26, adherence to formal rules of evi-
dence, more extensive appellate review, and so forth-in short, all of the procedural accou-
trements that accompany a judicial proceeding. But part of the point of arbitration is that one
"trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, infor-
mality, and expedition of arbitration."
Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless, 379 F.3d 159, 175-76 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mitsubi-
shi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
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arbitration awards themselves. 303 The FAA's restrictions on judicial re-
view, however, significantly limit the tools and options available to a court
interested in policing arbitration secrecy. 304 Contract defenses like uncon-
scionability and public policy produce inconsistent results and may risk
preemption. In any event, many confidential arbitrations will escape judi-
cial review altogether if participants comply with the agreement or the
award and never seek court assistance. For that reason, judicial discretion
alone cannot adequately regulate arbitration confidentiality, making "sun-
shine in ADR" legislation additionally necessary. 305
Greater justification supports mediation and settlement confidentiality.
However, as the law drives more litigants to utilize these forms of court-
based ADR, and as judges themselves become more "embedded" in civil
settlement processes, even these non-binding, settlement-based forms of
ADR may require greater judicial and legislative scrutiny.306
Increased transparency and accessibility to at least some aspects of
ADR in at least some cases would disclose information important to other
potential claimants, facilitate accountability and deterrence, and encourage
public confidence in ADR. 307 In other words, as in litigation, the time has
come to permit some sun to shine in on alternative dispute resolution.
303. See supra Part III.A.
304. See supra note 154. See also Weinstein & Wimberly, Secrecy in Law and Science, supra note
2, at 26 (noting that "there is little the court can do to compel disclosure" in arbitration).
305. I have previously suggested that litigation confidentiality is best dealt with through informed
exercise of judicial discretion, rather than inflexible sunshine in litigation legislation. See Dor6, Secrecy
by Consent, supra note 2, at 402. Limitations unique to arbitration, however, may render judicial discre-
tion inadequate to deal with arbitration secrecy. Moreover, preemption concerns may require that any
legislative solution emanate from Congress. See Randall, supra note 105, at 188 (indicating that Su-
preme Court has foreclosed "direct state law solutions to the problems posed by arbitration").
306. See Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 16, at 643 (advocating judicial and legislative
regulation of both judges and parties involved in court-based bargaining).
307. See Brenowitz, supra note 10, at 705 (supporting amendment of ADR Act to exempt cases of
public interest from confidentiality requirement); Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 169, at 38-39 (advocat-
ing publication of mediated resolutions); Thornburg, supra note 17, at 277 (arguing that legislative
solutions should ensure an "acceptable level of procedural fairness and disclosure").
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